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East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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SOFIA PAPER CALLS FOR IMPROVEMENT IN POLITICAL, MILITARY TRAINING

Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 29 Jan 82 pp 1, 2

[Editorial: "An Important Event for Communists in the Army and Military Groups"]

[Text] The successful accomplishment of the tasks set by the XII Congress of the BCP demands a complete mobilization of the creative forces, the energy, the experience and the ability of every communist, of every worker. In this persistent and selfless toil and struggle for the realization of the general policy of the April Plenum, the role and responsibility of the primary party organizations grow exceptionally. It was no accident that Todor Zhivkov, last year in his report before the October national conference stressed that they (the PPO's--TR) are the natural center and the social midst where new more complicated problems are solved.

In response to the higher requirements, the Secretariat of the CC of the BCP announced a survey throughout the first quarter of 1983, for elevating the role and the effectiveness of the primary party organization in the struggle for carrying out the decisions of the 12th Party Congress.

The basic aim of the survey is to expand the creativeness, enterprise, and responsibility of the primary party organization for the realization of the party forum requirements in raising the effectiveness and military preparedness of the BNA [Bulgarian People's Army]. This remarkable political event will, in the highest degree, contribute toward the further ideological and organizational consolidation of each primary party organization in the army; it will insure the flawless execution of the plans for military and political training and the construction programs by all military (construction) units.

The excellent preparation, organization, and implementation of the survey will help in strengthening the self-stimulated character of the primary party organizations in the further enrichment of internal party organization as a model of socialist democracy. The organization and discipline of the communists will be raised to a higher level as will their personal example in military, labor, social and political life. The primary party organization will perfect its style of work and will truly be transformed into the leading political nucleus of the respective unit and will be the prototype of its

future condition. It will assert itself as a firm support of its members in their striving to develop and to bear the calling of communist with honor.

Three basic stages are outlined in the organization and execution of the survey. What unites them is the purposeful, systematic and versatile activity for carrying out the decisions in full. Although the initiatives to be taken have specific time spans, the survey is not a campaign, but an essential feature of the modus operandi of the political organs and party committees together with the primary organizations. With it, a greater degree of organization and productivity is introduced into this activity.

During the first stage of the survey an important task is the elaboration of a full and objective characterization of the strengths and weaknesses of the primary party organization. Within this, the following rather important questions must be clarified and evaluated: what is the effect of the PPO on the development of the labor, social and educational obligations of the respective units; what is the extent and depth of internal party democracy, does it correspond with the political maturity, intellectual level and the social contribution of the communists and others.

The primary and basic thing in the second stage is the practical realization of the initiatives mentioned for raising and strengthening the work of the PPO. The guiding element in this stage is the concrete organizational and political activity of the communists and the rest of the personnel to display their creative strengths, abilities and drive in the struggle to meet the requirements of the congress for high military preparedness on the part of the army.

During the third stage of the survey, an evaluation will be made of what has been achieved from among the actions which were implemented and applied towards increasing the role and the responsibility of the PPO as a leading political nucleus of the military unit and as a prototype of its future composition.

The survey is a rigorous and exacting examination of the maturity of each party leadership, of each communist. It is not an external, demonstrative gesture by the primary organization but a serious test of the moral strengths, an occasion for self-analysis, for self-evaluation, for self-perfection. Not only the secretary and the members of the bureau, but each individual communist is personally responsible for its implementation. In the preparation and evaluation of the character sketch, in the search for the causes for the weaknesses and in pointing out the ways and the forms for making it prevail decisively, literally in all activity concerning the survey, each communist has his share and is obliged, first to begin with himself, to judge himself. Here the ideological requirement, that everyone is personally responsible for everything to everyone, is fully applicable.

The results of the survey will be even more productive if the appropriate leading groups will know how to involve creatively komsomol members and non-party people in its total realization. In evaluating the activity and determining future tasks of the primary party organization, their opinions, critical notes and expedient proposals are a valuable reserve for heightening the

political consciousness and the social activity of all personnel. Getting a hold on this reserve and an active relationship with it will mean that it will become an essential feature of the style of party leaderships. In this way, the more successfully one of the basic problems of the survey is solved, the more the connections and interaction of the primary organization with military units and soldiers will be strengthened.

The successful organization and execution of the survey depends to a great extent on the activity, competence and approach of the respective political departments, party committees and deputy commanders of the political section and on the political maturity of commanders and leaders.

The duty of the political organs and the party committees is not only to take the lead in the survey, but also directly and very actively to take part in its complete realization, to resolve duly all questions which have arisen, to be informed about the main accomplishments and to take active measures to eliminate the weaknesses. In this responsible political task, hack work and rigid determination of the initiatives and approaches for all primary organizations can only reduce the results of the efforts which are made. This is why a creative approach which will insure the intensification of the spontaneous character of the primary party organization is indispensable, so that its ability develops and that it sets for itself socially significant goals and tasks.

Bulgarian soldiers gladly and enthusiastically greet the survey as an important political event, not only for party organizations, but for all military units. Because they see in the primary party organization not only the representative of the party in the unit, but also as the representative of the unit to the party.

It is an incontrovertible fact that the survey which was presented on increasing the role and efficiency of primary party organizations will help strengthen these further and will raise their capability so that they will be a leading force for the realization of the party's expectations for high military preparedness of the troops.

1400
CSO: 2200/62

REPORT ON PLENUM OF CENTRAL AUDITING CONTROL COMMISSION

Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 29 Jan 82 p 2

[Text] Yesterday the plenum of the Central Auditing Control Commission [CACC] of the Bulgarian Communist Party was held under the presidency of Stoyan Karadzhov, the chairman of the commission.

An accountability report on the activity of the CACC of the BCP in 1981 was read by the first deputy chairman, Stamo Kerezov. The report makes a profound analysis of the work of the CACC of the BCP in the light of the tasks set by the 12th Congress of the Party and by the general secretary of the Central Committee, Todor Zhivkov, at the national convention of party, state, economic and social activists on 24 October 1981.

The comprehensive activity of the Central Auditing Control Commission of the BCP was directed towards accomplishing the main socioeconomic task defined by the Congress, growing satisfaction of the material and spiritial needs of the workers through an intensification of the national economy, consistent application of the new economic approach, the new economic mechanism and the further improvement of socialist productive relations.

The CACC of the BCP has devoted special attention to raising further the leading role of the party, preserving the purity in its ranks and increasing the fighting efficiency of the primary party organization.

Approval was given for reciprocal relations and joint inspections by the national control system and the organs of social control in the struggle against negative phenomena.

On the basis of the positive balance sheet, the plenum designated the tasks of the members and leadership of the CACC of the BCP for 1982. (BTA)

1400
CSO: 2200/62

DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER INTERVIEWED ON ASIA VISIT

East Berlin HORIZONT in German Vol 15 No 6, 1982 (signed to press 1 Feb 82) pp 3-4

[Interview with Col Gen Heinz Kessler, deputy minister for national defense and chief, Political Main Administration, National People's Army (NVA); place and date of interview not given: "Successful Asia Trip of GDR Military Delegation"]

[Text] [Question] Comrade Colonel General, in January 1982 a GDR military delegation spent some time in the SRV, the People's Republic of Kampuchea [PRK] and the Lao People's Democratic Republic [LPDR]. What was the purpose of this trip?

[Answer] The GDR military delegation which was led by Gen Heinz Hoffmann, member of the Politburo of the SED Central Committee and minister for national defense, was charged, on the basis of the agreements on friendship and cooperation which exist between our countries, with deepening the traditional relations of the solidarity of the SED, the people of the GDR and its armed forces with the parties, peoples and armies of the countries visited. The leader of the delegation delivered to the representatives of these countries messages from Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR Council of State.

Our task involved gaining more thorough information about the political and economic problems in respect to the socialist structure and to the development of national defense in order to utilize it as the basis of future cooperation between the NVA and the Vietnamese People's Army [VPA], the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea [RAK] and the Laotian People's Liberation Army [LPLA].

[Question] What made the most lasting impression on you during the military delegation's trip through the three countries that are such close friends with us?

[Answer] In whichever of the three countries we held discussions with the leading comrades of the party, the state or the army, with visits to troop formations and units or instructional facilities for the armed forces: we were always impressed with what dedication and political responsibility the next steps in respect to the socialist structure were laid out and at the same time with what determination dependable protection of the revolutionary achievements is pursued.

On the spot we learned how grave the legacy is which is present because of the French, Japanese and American intruders together with their local puppets. All the more remarkable is the optimism which we encountered everywhere and which--and this we know to be a fact--is historically justified. I recall the words of Pham Van Dong, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the KPV [Communist Party of Vietnam] and chairman of the SRV Council of Ministers, which he used when he received our delegation for talks. "Yes, we have difficulties. But we are communists, and we are used to coping with them. We have all the prerequisites in order to be victorious: a strong party, a strong friend--the Soviet Union--, people who are able to accomplish a lot, and not least good weapons."

The the explanation for this optimism can also be sought in the active solidarity which was and is guaranteed by the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community--also including the GDR--to these countries in the years of their national liberation war and of the socialist structure, is in the nature of the thing.

We visited an infantry division of the VPA which, 10 days after its historic victory over the French expeditionary force under General de Casire at Dien Bien Phu, President Ho Chi Minh honored as a "Division of Victory" and whose training results today range between "good" and "very good." We visited an RAK infantry school--not far from Phnom Penh--which, course by course, trains politically and technically qualified cadres for service in the army. And in a Laotian fighter pilot squadron which is in the process of being built up, we saw a double takeoff by MiG 21s, followed the conscientious and extremely disciplined work at the command post--at the radar station and on the fighter guide map. What we saw strengthened in us the certainty that the comrades in arms in the southeast of the socialist camp are doing everything in their power in order to protect their socialist homeland from all aggressive attacks just as the members of the NVA and the GDR border guards do in the heart of Europe.

In my opinion, this was also among the most impressive experiences which our delegation had during the trip through these countries. And in all the talks which we had we left no doubt that in the future, too, our republic and its soldiers will provide political, moral and material support, within the framework of what is possible, for the socialist structure and its dependable protection in the SRV, in the PRK and in the LPDR.

[Question] You mentioned a grave legacy which is confronting these countries. Among other things, what do you have in mind in this regard?

[Answer] For decades these countries were involved in a national liberation struggle. Everything was subordinated to gaining the victory over the French colonial power, the Japanese occupation, the American aggressors and the local reaction. To say nothing of the backwardness which had been left to them by the colonial masters and which was eloquently expressed in the high percentage of illiterates which after the victory of the revolution had to be gradually reduced; in part this is still happening today.

For the seriousness of the legacy I would like to cite just one example. I remember how shocked we were when we left the "Tuol Sleng" monument and memorial, a former concentration camp not far from Phnom Penh, in which 20,000 sons and daughters of the Kampuchean people were brutally tortured and murdered by the Pol Pot regime. This regime was supported and sustained by the Peking hegemonists--by those forces which even today permit no peace in this region, which provoke border incidents, form and arm counterrevolutionary forces and seek to undermine the economy in a variety of ways.

Army Gen Heinz Hoffmann wrote as follows in the guestbook: "The GDR military delegation is deeply shocked by the severity of the suffering which the people of Kampuchea had to endure under the genoicde regime of the Pol Pot clique. They can depend on the fact that we will always stand at their side when it is a matter of creating the foundations for a flourishing socialist Kampuchea and of defending the freedom achieved."

The number of people who failed to live to experience the revolutionary uprising of the people of Kampuchea 3 years ago is in the millions. They were workers, scientists, teachers, architects, doctors, technologists and economic experts who were murdered by the thousands. Anyone suspected of being able to read and write was in danger of falling into the claws of the bloodhound Pol Pot. And if at the outset I mentioned a grave legacy, I meant not least the acute shortage of experts, which was carried to the extreme, without whom in any of these countries it is not now possible to get going and keep going a ruined economy, a broken down educational and health system. Here we do indeed have to contend with a grave legacy which will cost enormous effort to overcome.

[Question] What response does the solidarity of the GDR and its soldiers find in these countries?

[Answer] The GDR enjoys great respect in the three countries. We met specialists in the most diverse areas who are at home in the GDR. We heard of doctors who with considerable self-sacrifice provide assistance on the spot under complex climatic conditions. We saw trucks of the W-50 type on the roads, and in enterprises in the sister countries we saw machines and precision equipment from the Carl Zeiss VEB, Jena.

For example, in order to support the training of a qualified permanent staff of skilled workers in the PRK, 30 young Kampucheans began skilled worker training in our republic in September 1980.

They will return home as enterprise mechanics or professional foresters. In September 1981 similar training began for 60 additional compatriots. Others have come to the GDR for advanced school study or are taking continuing education courses. At the same time we are supporting Kampuchean comrades in building their own training facilities for skilled workers. In addition there is the direct help which we guarantee in the economic and scientific-technical sectors, among others also the developing cooperation in starting up the production of natural rubber again. These and other examples of solidarity could be cited here for all three of the countries visited.

I cannot recall a single encounter during the days of our trip in which our partners did not find sincere, heartfelt words of thanks for this solidarity. For example, at the Institute for Military Technology in Hanoi a lovely woman of 39 years in a captain's uniform stood before us, in 1957 she had been among the first 200 Vietnamese children who were invited at that time by Comrade Otto Grotewohl to the GDR. During that period she had been trained in our republic as a skilled worker in chemistry and later had studied chemistry at Martin Luther University in Halle. As she said, the GDR had become her second home. Now she received our delegation together with the scientists, researchers and technical staff workers of the Institute. She had experienced herself what we in our country understand by active solidarity.

A country like hers needs people with the necessary specialized knowledge in all sectors just as they need their daily rice. We had a variety of such encounters in the SRV and the LPDR. Currently a doctor of natural sciences, 12 doctors of other sciences, 13 advanced school graduates, 5 specialists for scientific-technical administration and 35 technical cadres and skilled workers who received their training in the GDR are working at the Institute for Military Technology alone. The director of this facility, Chief Col Phan Thu, "hero of the VPA" and once a successful fighter pilot, paid tribute to this help with extremely cordial words--help which in the past few years made possible the building of laboratories and which at present is also being expressed, among other things, in the installation of an electronic information storage facility.

[Question] In the press releases there was talk of a Technical School for Noncommissioned Officers which was developed with our help in Ho-Chi-Minh City. What can be said about that?

[Answer] At this school we also held discussions with comrades who have studied in our country. The school trains specialists who service, care for and maintain optical devices, small arms, artillery weapons, radio equipment of high and low frequency, but also road construction machinery and other equipment. Every year noncommissioned officers in 24 categories are trained who, with a high political sense of responsibility, the necessary theoretical knowledge and versatile practical skills, also have all the prerequisites in order to make a contribution in the army to constant improvement of the combat readiness of our Vietnamese sister army. You already said this, but this school was built with the support of the GDR. Our help extended on up to the preparation of curricula which were developed in close cooperation with our Vientamese partners. Specialists from the GDR communicated especially to the instructors theoretical knowledge and practical skills, among other things--and this was stressed many times during our visit--such as how modern precision equipment, under the conditions of extremely high humidity, can be protected from harmful climatic conditions. On the spot it was possible to convince us of the fact that this form of our solidarity is of great value.

[Question] What were the military delegation's happiest experiences during this trip?

[Answer] No doubt these were the encounters with the very youngest citizens of these countries which we had in the course of the trip--whether in the "Bamboo Shoots" kindergarten in Hanoi, in an orphanage near Phnom Penh or

in a Laotian kindergarten. One must have experienced in what a well protected way these children grow up, to what extent the parties and the governments of these countries are concerned about their well-being in spite of all the complicated facts of the situation. But one must also have seen the big wondering eyes of the children when we spread out in front of them the gifts from the citizens of our country: children's clothes, wooden trains, puzzle games, balls, teddybears, crayons and many other things. One has to have seen how their eyes lighted up when they heard of the greetings from their peers in kindergartens in the GDR and how they "examined" the drawings which had been sent along. In parting we said to them: "Our wish for you is that you can grow up in peace." And in these words we saw at the same time the obligation to do everything in our power for this peace jointly with our comrades in arms in Southeast Asia and resolutely obstruct the path of any who seek to disrupt it with their criminal machinations and fear nothing.

[Question] Which results of the visit by the military delegation in the three countries would you highlight?

[Answer] First, I can suggest overall that the goals of this trip, which I mentioned at the beginning of our interview, were fully achieved. We were able on the spot to be convinced of the successes which were achieved in these sorely tested countries on the road of social progress. We came to understand even better their difficulties and problems. Undoubtedly the visit by our military delegation also contributed to the further deepening in particular of the relations of the NVA with the armed forces to the SRV, the PRK and the LPDR. Among other things, this is expressed in arrangements with the armed forces of these countries on the basis of the agreements which exist between the GDR and the countries visited. These arrangements underscore the commonality of our struggle and our goals. They help to continue the exchange of experience and the fraternal help in respect to bolstering the defense strength of these countries and make it possible for us to provide more purposefully and effectively practical solidarity like we have been doing for years.

[Question] At the conclusion of its trip the GDR military delegation spent some time in the Republic of India.

[Answer] Even the visit in the Republic of India was among the highpoints of our meetings. We became familiar with Delhi, the capital city, and were able to become informed about the problems of the country. Of special importance were the visits by Army Gen Heinz Hoffmann with Indira Gandhi, prime minister of the Republic of India, and R Venkataraman, the newly named minister of defense. Indira Gandhi, for example, expressed the idea that there is no alternative to the policy of peaceful coexistence. She explained: "We value the friendship with the GDR very highly, and I still well remember my visit to the GDR." In the cordial talks she affirmed the commonality in all fundamental questions of the present. In India, too, we sensed that the GDR enjoys a good reputation in South Asia and Southeast Asia, that our policy, which is directed at peace and social progress, the energetic solidarity in the struggle against imperialism and hegemony is very well received.

12124
CSO: 2300/155

LAW PROFESSORS CRITICIZE REGULATION ON 'MITIGATION OF SENTENCE'

Potsdam-Babelsberg STAAT UND RECHT in German Vol 31 No 1, Jan 82 (signed to press 19 Nov 81) pp 11-22

[Article by Prof Dr Guenther Kraeupl and Dr Lothar Reuter, Department of Political Science and Jurisprudence, Friedrich Schiller University, Jena: "The Perpetrator's Personality in the Process of Incurring a Penalty and in Relation to Fixing the Penalty"]

[Text] Marxist social scientists have made noticeably greater efforts in recent years to understand better the process of the determination and conduct of personality. They have been dealing more thoroughly with this subject matter because the role of the subject has notably grown in the process of socioeconomic change in our society thus far. Because of our higher level and an advanced equalization in individual social-educational living conditions, the development of personality and the self-determination of personality conduct have now become possible to a wider extent. The subject's own active role in determining personality and conduct grows faster today than previously in an individual developmental process. And so we needs have to take the individual more into account for the sake of enforcing general social goals. Criminology also has recognized the problem as an important one in basic theory.[1]

For the field of psychology, A. N. Leontiev has found its status conditioned by the contradiction between a vast amount of facts and inadequate theoretical foundations.[2] This tells us something too about criminology's foundation in personality theory. This unsatisfactory state of affairs is perceived especially in places where assured theoretical findings are of an immediate consequence to practice, e.g. in criminal law. The general part of the GDR's Criminal Law Textbook of 1976 says in this connection that scientific crime research on the role of the perpetrator's personality still is in its infancy. That is also reflected by the uneven use made of the concept of perpetrator in the criminal law of the various socialist countries.

I

The Marxist realization that personality and conduct are pr'marily determined by the external social and educational conditions of life must ..ot mislead us to misconceive personality, all too diminished and oversimplified, and principally merely

as an object, as the result of adjustment to external conditions, and too little as an active subject, self-determining. That interpretation carries over the Marxist definition of the human being as an aggregate of social relations to a given individual in a linear way, regarding it as the definition of personality. In this definition of the essence of man (as a species) one does find the basic position of the primary social determination of human personality (as an individual), without the concept of personality becoming thereby sufficiently defined. A linear transfer to a given personality tends to overemphasize the determination by external relations and pays insufficient attention to the activities of the individual in creating or changing his own circumstances of life and to individual responsibility that belongs to it.[3]

Based on Marx' own definition of man there are diverse conceptions and definitions of personality. But these differences are not fundamental in kind. As a uniform basic position, the following is accepted: Personality means a particular quality of the human individual, to the effect that the subject's social determination and conscious activity coincide in a process of confrontation with the material and mental conditions of life and with himself.

Now one has to realize that the self-determination factor is not an abstract addendum to personality. The degree of self-determination ultimately depends on the material possibilities for the development of personality, on the historically concrete degree to which the individual can free himself from an immediate subservience to external conditions. To that extent then, personality is also socially determined with respect to self-determination. This self-determination ability is the sphere for actively controlling one's own personality development and actual conduct. On that, penal law is based. But it is also up to criminology to pay more attention to that aspect in explaining the causes, conditions and mechanisms in individually incurring penalties, and for conceptions for individual-educational work with criminally endangered and perpetrators.

The mediating role of the internal conditions takes effect in the subjective absorption of the external conditions (selection and evaluation) and in the subject's activity as an active reaction to those conditions (shaping or changing them). A more aware and stronger influence must be brought to bear on these mediating processes also among criminals. It is not enough to change external conditions of life (e.g. through placement in a firm work collective); we must also increasingly develop the ability to evaluate the external conditions in line with social standards. And finally it is a matter of fostering an active participation in changing one's own conditions of life (especially those that induce crime) because personality changes mainly through such a process and not through passive accommodation.

The determination of personality and conduct is generally understood as follows: In active confrontation with social-educational developmental conditions, personality forms (particularly by developing attitudes and a self-determination ability), and the personality so formed determines any concrete act of conduct by passing on actual socioeducational environmental conditions (especially within the family, at work and at leisure) and the conditions of the immediate action situation.

The dynamics of this process in the ontogenesis of man often only receives perfunctory attention. There, an individual frees himself from his initially direct subordination under external conditions. Internal conditions in formation increasingly enter into the personality formation and conduct regulation. Internal determination replaces external determination. Under such conditions, personality prefers certain external conditions and avoids others or restructures them. To criminality that appears as the problem of the perpetrator's relative independence or relative self-determination in the determination process of personality formation and conduct. The increase in internal determination is shown by the fact that when people get older, the process of incurring penalties primarily under direct external determination, through situation conditions or direct group influences (typical of children and adolescents), yields to a process of incurring penalties primarily under internal determination, largely independent of situations and groups.

The criminological relevance of this dynamic factor is found most clearly in recidivists: In comparison with first offenders, the differences found in them are due less to the environment than, rather, to the personality, with individual recidivism proceeding (i.e., in adding to the criminal record).[4] For recidivists, the grown internal conditions more strongly determine conduct than in the case of first offenders. Our investigations have confirmed previous data, to the effect that motives and decisions for crimes in recidivists, in contrast to first offenders, are less determined by the situation (through direct conditions in the crime situation) but more habitually so (through attitudes).[5] This habitual conditioning increases in individual recidivism and is largest in cases of multiple recidivism.

When the inner determination of conduct grows, one must increasingly pay more attention to criminal intent. It is thus not a matter of just looking for higher criminal intent but of giving attention to specific stages of personality formation. To the extent that the conception of criminal discrimination in the system of measures is affected by it, such considerations will have to remain related to the recidivism process.

Since the late 1960's criminal motivation investigations have benefited our criminological personality research. Focusing on the attitude category has been found useful because attitudes simply are central personal dispositions controlling the whole personality and constitute, as it were, the essential internal field of mediation for external influences, by which they essentially define the content and mechanism in this mediation.[6]

Attitude fields of special importance, criminologically speaking, are the attitude toward society, law, one's own offense, work, other people, the family, leisure time, and one's own personality. Then in individual cases there also are attitudes that are offense-specific, relating to the norms violated by the act (e.g., attitude toward property or physical integrity).

Our investigations have made apparent the special importance of the attitude toward one's own personality. It confirms the remark made by I. I. Karpez, that criminology had thus far done little in exploring self-assurance but that this gained importance due to the accelerated development of personality.[7] A special investigation has been started meanwhile.[8] Thereby criminology follows Marxist psychology

that has in recent years noticeably turned to the problem of self-assurance as the "core of personality." The weakness of criminological knowledge about this only is reflected by the fact that psychology itself has thus far done much too little in examining self-assurance.[9]

It would be a mistake to think of, and explore, self-assurance merely as the awareness of one's inner self. Self-determination and personal responsibility are its essential elements.[10] That is directly linked with the problem of self-education, for which the ability to be self-critical in the judgment of one's own personality is critical. An important task of criminal proceedings and the subsequent educational process thus is to make the perpetrator critically evaluate his own personality.

Statements on this problem in criminological literature are in part still contradictory. It is being said, e.g., that offenders are more frequently dissatisfied with themselves than others,[11] but also that offenders have an excessively positive evaluation of themselves throughout.[12] Recidivists are likely to be altogether more frequently dissatisfied with their social status and character. Status and character contentment, however, improves in the individual recidivist process. In particular, offenders who do not care to change or are rootless or asocial and those who deliberately defy educational influences more often accept their social status and personality than others do. They are evidently no longer adequately capable of evaluating themselves self-critically.

Dissatisfaction with oneself is, in principle, a positive start for education and self-education, even if one has to modify this by saying that this does not automatically generate activity for change. But such a condition at least indicates the ability to recognize the contradiction between one's own attitudes and socially required conduct. Experiencing this contradiction essentially gives the offender the ability and willingness to educate himself, accept educational influences, and change his own life style. Personality change presupposes as a subjective handle a minimum of self-critical reflection.

The contradiction between social demands and one's own attitudes toward the environment is covered up and not actively experienced to the extent that an individual has gotten used to not being able to cope or makes his own distorted attitudes, arrogantly, the sole measure. Depending on which of the mechanisms weighs more, that of being used to it or that of arrogance, self-satisfaction ultimately produces either a condition of indifference to improvements (rootless-asocial offenders) or of unwillingness for improvements (offenders who deliberately defy educational influences). Having lost the minimum of self-critical reflection, the subjective prerequisites have been lost for effective education in a normal environment. It would be asking too much of the environment, and the danger of recidivism would be high. First one would have to recreate this subjective prerequisite through special forms of intensive sociopedagogical influence.

II

With regard to criminal proceedings and fixing penalties, we are mainly interested in how the penalty and the other measures that come with it can be structured in such a way that they encourage a proper social development of the perpetrator's personality and effectively prevent the danger of more crimes. Criminal literature

has offered many ideas about that in recent years,[13] mainly with the intention to make a better use of our differentiated penalty system, in conformity with our greater social educational conditions and from a profound awareness of the self-education processes for offenders, to individualize penalties. Here the question keeps arising about the importance of the perpetrator's personality for fixing penalties, which must theoretically be settled mainly with regard to the dialectics between the objective and the subjective (the guilt; the perpetrator's ability and willingness to observe social conduct in the future), the ratio between objective and subjective factors in fixing the penalty, and our penalty policy altogether. Stă[illegible]ays about that: "We must be aware that any overemphasis placed on objective factors may lead to routine procedures, and placed on subjective factors, to subjectivism in our penalty policy."[14]

The principles in fixing penalties in the European socialist countries unanimously contain the demand for taking the perpetrator's personality into consideration, but the conceptualizations tied to it differ. Hungarian and Bulgarian penal codes ask for taking into account a perpetrator's danger to society. Those of the USSR and Romania say the perpetrator's personality should be taken into consideration and let it go at that. The penal code of the CSSR calls for regard for the perpetrator's chances to improve and his circumstances.

The circumstances of the perpetrators' personality are accounted for in the catalogues for penalty mitigating and aggravating provisions in the penal codes of the USSR, the CSSR and Romania. According to the Hungarian penal code, other mitigating and aggravating circumstances are to be taken into account which, however, are not legally defined and thus must be interpreted through jurisdiction. The Bulgarian penal code calls for considering "other circumstances mitigating crime," which are not any more closely defined legally, either. In the penal codes of the other socialist countries (with the exception of Romania), the possibility for extraordinary mitigation is, among other things, anchored in circumstances resulting from the perpetrator's personality.

In view of our investigations into recidivism, the theoretical conception of the perpetrator's danger to society is of special interest. That conception arose during the development of socialist penal law in the Soviet Union, evidently under the influence of representatives and followers of the bourgeois sociological criminal law school.[15] That was given expression, e.g., in the penal law guidelines of the RSFSR of December 1919, in figure 11, as follows: "In determining the degree to which a person having committed a crime is to be influenced, the court rules on the extent and character of the danger to society respecting both the perpetrator and the crime he has committed." It meant that in principle any perpetrator was to be considered dangerous to society. If conditions failed to arise under which a person was considered a danger to society, no criminal accountability existed (Guidelines figure 16).

The 1922 RSFSR penal code repeats the 1919 guidelines almost verbatim, but in Article 7 explicitly defines the concept "dangerousness of a person." It was found "in the execution of acts harmful to society or an activity seriously threatening the commonweal." That conception was taken over into the penal codes of the USSR and the union republics of 1924 (Article 30), but the RSFSR penal code of 1926, in Article 45, contained the deviating guideline that the

endangerment to society by the crime committed, the circumstances of the act, and the perpetrator's personality had to be taken into consideration. An explicit reference to the perpetrator's danger to society was omitted.

USSR criminal legislation from 1958 to 1961 likewise avoided any reference to the "perpetrator's danger to society" in the articles dealing with the fixing of penalties, yet the overall context of crime regulations suggests that the basic thesis on the perpetrator's danger to society was maintained (cf. e.g. Articles 50 and 52 in the RSFSR Penal Code). Consistently, A. A. Piontkovski declared in 1961 that for individuating penalties both the endangerment of society and the personality of the perpetrator should have to be taken into account.[16] That standpoint also has been upheld by criminal law textbooks of recent vintage.[17] The degree of the perpetrator's danger to society is derived mainly from the nature of the crime committed which expresses "the perpetrator's personal traits, and his attitude to the interests of the socialist state and the legal order set down by it."[18] For judging the degree of the perpetrator's danger to society, furthermore, his concrete role in the crime, a criminal record or recidivism, and his attitude toward work duties and social, family and other duties, and toward the crime committed, were important.

As the literature suggests, the conception of the perpetrator's danger to society is resorted to, above all, to established an increased criminal accountability of recidivists[19] or dismiss proceedings or penalties. But currently it plays only a minor role in the USSR's theory for setting penalties. No mention of it is made in the USSR Supreme Court Plenum decision of 29 June 1979, "On the Practical Application of the General Principles in the Setting of Penalties by the Courts," though that decision emphatically asks for considering information about the perpetrator's personality in fixing his penalty. In Soviet criminal law and the directional jurisdiction of the USSR Supreme Court, one thus finds that the conception of the perpetrator's danger to society has evidently been dropped from the theory that determines the measure of penalties.

A rational core the conception doubtless does have. There are, as a matter of fact, not a few perpetrators who, on the ground of their previous conduct, do constitute a real danger to society and the socialist legal order. Such danger must not be ignored when the measure of penalties is determined, as it signals a lack of willingness on the part of the perpetrator to obey the laws in the future. While from it alone one cannot derive more severe penalties, the protective and security interests of the socialist state in such cases still justify certain state and social measures of influence along with the penalty. That is the direction, as one knows, in which GDR criminal law has in recent years been perfected (particularly by the 1st and 3rd criminal law amendments).

In our view, however, to justify such measures, no construct of a special "endangerment of society by the perpetrator" is needed but instead, and above all, a criminologically more reasonable analysis of the perpetrator-oriented criteria for determining penalty measures, principally the criterion as formulated in Article 61 section 2 of the Penal Code, "Ability and Willingness for Proper Social Conduct in the Future," which should be rendered more specific in its content and be utilized for improving the individuation of penalty.[21] Determining such an ability and willingness, it seems to us, allows a more discriminating view and

assessment of the personality than is possible by the criterion, "the perpetrator's danger to society," which in every given case is a matter of degree. The circumstance of "ability and willingness" does not proceed from such a "negative" graduation of the perpetrator, but from positive and constructive findings of personal prerequisites for proper social conduct in the future, so that through taking them into account when the measure of penalty is determined, not only the protection requirements (which, in our view, predominate in the conception of the danger of a perpetrator) and the general preventative effects, but also the individual-educational requirements can be kept well balanced and judged accordingly.

In general it may be said that the circumstances of the perpetrator's personality may cause more severe penalties when they increase the seriousness of the crime or spell out the objective harm of the act. If from there one analyses the circumstances which increase criminal accountability according to the penal codes of the USSR, the CSSR and Romania, one finds they express either a heightened severity of a crime or a heightened objective harm of the act. Such circumstances also are rated in almost every case of GDR jurisdiction as circumstances that may aggravate the criminal accountability. Catalogues for aggravating circumstances probably are a suitable supplement to general penalty adjudication principles as they invest with legal authority the circumstances that heighten criminal accountability. Their danger, however, is that they facilitate routine handling in the fixing of penalties and may lead to collisions with extenuating circumstances.[22]

Circumstances of the perpetrator's personality cannot, according to GDR penal law (Penal Code Article 62), lead to any extraordinary mitigation of penalty, in the sense that the threatening minimum prison sentence is reduced to the legal minimum or a prison sentence can be replaced by a penalty other than a prison sentence, except for circumstances relating to cases of extraordinary mitigation, legally made specific (e.g. diminished soundness of mind, diminished crime due to extraordinary circumstances). The extraordinary mitigation as of Article 62 section 3 in the Penal Code can yet not be based on circumstances in the perpetrator's personality characterizing his attitude before or after the act and suggesting his ability to behave responsibly in the future. It can only be applied when aggravating causes have not led to making the crime more severe, which would justify the threatening minimum prison sentence.[23]

That may give rise to problems in some cases, e.g., if the act was indeed a crime but stood in striking contradiction to the positive personality of the perpetrator and his special efforts to make good or turn state evidence. Less than the minimum prison sentence of 2 years is normally not granted for such reasons. Criminal law rulings in case of extrordinary mitigation, for these reasons and in comparison with rulings in the USSR, the CSSR, Hungary and Bulgaria, therefore do not seem flexible enough.

It is possible, to be sure, in the GDR that the perpetrator's great efforts at making good and such circumstances as his turning himself in himself and turning state evidence, through the regulations in Article 62 section 2 of the Penal Code, may lead to an extraordinarily reduced sentence, yet that provision is hardly ever used in practice. It would indeed be purposeful to find a similarly flexible solution as in other socialist countries, so that when there are extraordinary circumstances about the perpetrator's personality, which themselves do not justify an extraordinarily reduced sentence, one may pronounce less than the threatening minimum prison sentence or a penalty other than imprisonment.

III

Adequate respect for the perpetrator's personality as a relatively independent condition in the process that determines culpability and as the condition for an educational effect of criminal law and other measures, it seems to us, calls for three basic consequences:

1. Criminal investigation must get deeper insights into the perpetrator's personality. For one thing, the criminological relevance of external social-educational conditions is not adequately provided by the fact that they deviate from the norm. Rather, it can only be determined from the symptoms of the perpetrator's personality caused by them. On the other hand, a change of the external environmental conditions is not sufficient for educating the perpetrator. The internal conditions must explicitly be looked at as handles for educational influences. Their importance grows to the extent that in the personality development process a personality is formed, increasingly relatively independently of the environment, and a conduct is developed, also more or less regardless of the situation. This dynamic element tells us how necessary it is to differentiate the intensity of an investigation and the consideration given to the perpetrator's personality in criminal proceedings.

2. Ensuring justice and a higher effectiveness of adjudication call for individualizing penalties according to the degree to which the act conflicts with and endangers society and with consideration for the penetrator's ability and willingness to adopt a proper social conduct in the future. More importance must be attributed in criminal proceedings to understanding and evaluating the personality of the perpetrator, and what his other attitudes are and his circumstances in life. What matters here is completely utilizing our differentiated penalty system. Penalties and other criminal law measures to be linked with them must be pronounced more with a view to the perpetrator's future development.

3. Criminal investigation and a criminal law consideration for personality have to observe the dialectics between social determinants and self-determination in personality formation and conduct. Educational effects essentially depend on how the perpetrator is drawn into the changing of his own living conditions and his personality under his own responsibility. This self-determination must be explicitly respected; the perpetrator must be made aware of it; it must be demanded of him. And so even during criminal proceedings we have to encourage a more intensive self evaluation or the perpetrator's personality, a critical assessment he is drawn into himself. Especially through a detailed explanation and assessment of his personal guilt, self-determination and personal responsibility have to be made evident. Trends of shifting one's blame, as found especially among recidivists, must be opposed rigorously.

Finally, with regard to the guilt and educational ability and willingness, one has to answer the questions of how the perpetrator has come to grips with the crime-inducing conditions affecting him, what objective and subjective opportunities he had to come to grips with them, and what may be expected of him. After all, he may, in spite of his emphatic obligation and suitable assistance, have let himself slip into crime-inducing conditions, or may have looked for them or created them himself. A modicum of critical self-evaluation by the perpetrator in these

confrontations with himself is indispensably prerequisite to self-education and the willingness to accept educational influences. If that is lacking, special sociopedagogical efforts are required which, as a rule, are not possible in the normal environment.

FOOTNOTES

1. Cf. J. Lekschas, "New Methodological Aspects in Criminological Research," "Aktuelle Beitraege zur Kriminalitaetsforschung." (Topical Contributions to Criminological Research) "Wissenschaftliche Schriftenreihe" (Science Series), Humboldt University, Berlin, 1980, pp 9 ff.

2. Cf. A. N. Leontiev, "Taetigkeit-Bewusstsein-Persoenlichkeit" (Activity-Awareness-Personality), Berlin, 1979, p 10.

3. Cf. M. Vorwerg, "Personality Psychology Implications About the Individual in Society," DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUER PHILOSOPHIE, 1980, pp 430 f; cf. also B. D. Parygin, "Grundlagen der sozialpsychologischen Theorie" (Principles of Social Psychology), Berlin, 1976, p 48.

4. Previous comment on that by R. Hartmann and H. Dettenborn, "Criminal Activity and Personality," JUGENDFORSCHUNG, 1969, No 9, pp 69 ff.

5. Cf. H. Dettenborn, "Beziehungen im psychologisch relevanten Determinationskomplex der Jugendkriminalitaet" (Relations in a Psychologically Relevant Complex of Determinants in Juvenile Crime), Dissertation, Berlin, 1970, pp 133 and 146.

6. Cf. Y. A. Budilova, "Philosophische Probleme in der sowjetischen Psychologie" (Philosophical Problems in Soviet Psychology), Berlin, 1975, pp 243 f.

7. Cf. I. I. Karpets, "Topical Problems of Criminal Law and Criminology," (in Russian), Moscow, 1976 pp 92 f.

8. Cf. A. R. Ratinov, N. Y. Konstantinovka, and E. M. Sobchik, "The Self-Evaluation of Perpetrators," "The Perpetrator's Personality as an Object of Psychological Examination," (in Russian), Moscow, 1979.

9. Cf. L. I. Bozhovich, "Phases of Personality Development During Ontogenesis," "Sowjetwissenschaft (GB)," 1979, pp 753 and 762.

10. Cf. S. L. Rubinstein, "Grundlagen der allgemeinen Psychologie" (Principles of General Psychology), Berlin, 1973, p 832; cf. also B. D. Parygin, op. cit., pp 101, 123 f.

11. Cf. H. Dettenborn and H.-H. Froehlich, "Psychologische Probleme der Taeterpersoenlichkeit" (Psychological Problems in the Perpetrator's Personality), Berlin, 1971, p 53.

12. Cf. A. R. Ratinov et al, op. cit., p 78.

13. Cf. particularly J. Streit, "On the Creative Application of Criminal Law in Socialist Society," NEUE JUSTIZ, 1977, pp 574 ff; H. Harrland, "On Some Questions of Penalty and Its Efficacy," NEUE JUSTIZ, 1977, pp 36 ff; E. Buchholz, "Socialist Justice as the Principle for Fixing Penalties," STAAT UND RECHT, 1977, pp 126 ff; U. Daehn, "The Principle for Making the Punishment Fit the Crime," NEUE JUSTIZ, 1980, pp 12 ff; G Kraeupl, "The Principle for Making the Punishment Fit the Crime and Taking Account of the Perpetrator's Personality and His Social Environment in the Adjudication of Crimes," STAAT UND RECHT, 1980, pp 434 ff.

14. J. Streit, op, cit., p 578.

15. On the influence by followers of the sociological school on the development of Soviet criminal law, cf. "Course in Soviet Criminal Law," Vol I, (in Russian), Moscow, 1970, p 35.

16. Cf. A. A. Piontkovski, "Strengthening the Role of the Public in Crime Fighting and Some Questions of the Theory of Soviet Criminal Law," SOVETSKOE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO, 1961, No 4, p 23.

17. Cf., e.g., "Course in Soviet Criminal Law," Vol III, op. cit., (in Russian), pp 128 ff.

18. Op. cit.; cf. also B. V. Volshenkin, "The Perpetrator's Danger to Society and the Principles of Criminal Accountability," PRAVOVODENIYE, 1963, No 3, p 96; B. V. Volshenkin, "On the Criteria for Perpetrators' Danger to Society," SOVETSKAYA YUSTITSIYA, 1966, No 3, p 9.

19. Cf. A. M. Yakoviev, "Fighting Against Recidivism," (in Russian), Moscow, 1964. pp 89 ff.

20. SOVESTSKAYA YUSTITSIYA, 1979, No 16, pp 21 ff; Cf. G. Kriger, "General Principles in Fixing Penalties, ibid., 1980. No 1, pp 18 ff.

21. Cf. E. Buchholz and H. Dettenborn, "The Perpetrator's Ability and Willingness for Responsible Conduct in the Future," NEUE JUSTIZ, 1979, pp 440 ff; 1980, pp 109 ff; G Kraeupl, L. Reuter and W. Mueller, "The Perpetrator's Ability and Willingness for Responsible Conduct in the Future as a Criterion for Determining the Measure of Punishment," NEUE JUSTIZ, 1980, pp 414 ff.

22. Article 80 in the Romanian Penal Code has special provisions for the case that aggravating and mitigating circumstances meet.

23. Cf."Report by the Presidium to the 2nd Plenary Session of the Supreme Court, 29 March 1972 (Section I, Figure 5.1)," NEUE JUSTIZ, 1972, supplement 2.

5885
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NEW DEPARTMENTS CREATED AT KARL MARX UNIVERSITY, LEIPZIG

'Scientific Communism' Department

East Berlin DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUER PHILOSOPHIE in German Vol 30 No 1, Jan 82 (signed to press 2 Nov 81) pp 123-124

[Report by Dr Karl-Heinz Gehlauf, Department of Scientific Communism, Karl Marx University, Leipzig: "Creation of the Department 'Scientific Communism' at Karl Marx University, Leipzig." A translation of SED's Social Science Central Research Plan for 1981-85 cited below is published in JPRS 77514, 5 Mar 81, No 1854 of this series, pp 23-25]

[Text] The Karl Marx University, Leipzig section "Marxist-Leninist Philosophy/Scientific Communism" was reorganized effective 1 September 1981. It was subdivided into two sections: "Marxist-Leninist Philosophy" and "Scientific Communism." The department "Marxist-Leninist Sociology" and the "Student Research Laboratory" are attached to the "Scientific Communism" section.

The creation of the two sections is an outgrowth of the objective social requirements of the eighties aiming for higher quality—as outlined in the "Central Research Plan of the GDR for the Marxist-Leninist Social Sciences for 1981-85"[1]—and the developmental conditions that arose in the section as it was. It also became possible and necessary as a consequence of the scientific profiles and potentials developed in theory, education and research. But it also is one of the essential preconditions to help achieve the graduate profiles in the specialized fields of training teachers of Marxism-Leninism as defined by 18 March 1980 resolution of the Politburo of the SED central committee.

Since 1968, 595 graduates of the university itself and more than 900 graduates of correspondence courses have successfully concluded their studies as qualified teachers of Marxism-Leninism in the specialized discipline of scientific communism or as qualified sociologists—some of them also as a result of a one-year post-graduate course of study. 79 young scientists defended their thesis A and another seven their thesis B in the specialized fields of scientific communism and Marxist-Leninist sociology.

1. Cf: Central Research Plan of the GDR for the Marxist-Leninist Social Sciences for 1981-85 in EINHEIT No 12/1980

Research collectives are forming in the section which have come out with some noteworthy publications—among them the textbook "Scientific Communism" for use in basic Marxist-Leninist studies compiled under the direction of Prof Dr sc Guenther Grosser; the magazine series "Problems of Scientific Communism;" the monograph "The Labor Movement in Present-Day Capitalism" and also the research reports by the sociologists and their collaboration on the textbook "Marxist-Leninist Sociology." We might also mention the great number of conferences with international participants—above all those of the research group headed by Prof Dr sc Harry Pawla.[2]

Mainly since the 8th SED party congress, the scientific discipline of scientific communism has undergone greater development at the Karl Marx University, Leipzig and now occupies an important place in GDR university life.

The "Scientific Communism" section is the only one in the GDR to train qualified teachers in the specialised discipline of scientific communism as well as qualified sociologists. The GDR research plan for the social sciences for 1981-85 places greater demand on research in the field of scientific communism which is called upon to contribute "to the further elaboration of basic questions of the Marxist-Leninist theory of socialist revolution and of the strategies and tactics of the international class struggle" and "to the enhancement of the theory and practice of developed socialism" as well as to "the systematic intensification of research into the history, theory and methodology of scientific communism."[3] These increased demands call for the concentration of the existing potential in a separate section which is to include the following courses of study under the specialised discipline of scientific communism: methodology of scientific communism; communist social formation; social relations under socialism; political system and political guidance and leadership under socialism; revolutionary world process; anti-monopoly struggle in capitalist countries; history of scientific communism; critique of bourgeois political theories, and didactic methodology of scientific communism. Under the specialised discipline of sociology will be included: the theory of Marxist-Leninist sociology; history of sociology and critique of modern bourgeois sociology; methodology, methods and techniques of sociological research; statistics; sociology of work and of management as well as industrial sociology, urban sociology and the sociology of housing.

The first scientific conference organized by the "Scientific Communism" section on the theme "The 10th SED Party Congress and the Tasks of the Scientific Communism section" was held on 8 October 1981.[4]

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2. Cf reports in INFORMATIONSBULLETIN WISSENSCHAFTLICHER KOMMUNISMUS Nos 2/1976, 3/1977, 1/1978, 3/1978, 4/1979, 3/1980 and in DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUER PHILOSOPHIE Nos 6/1974, 4/1975, 8/1976, 11/1977, 11/1978

3. GDR Central Research Plan for Marxist-Leninist Social Sciences 1981-85

4. CF conference protocol in INFORMATIONSBULLETION WISSENSCHAFTLICHER KOMMUNISMUS, special issue 1982

'Marxist-Leninist Philosophy' Department

East Berlin DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUER PHILOSOPHIE in German Vol 30 No 1, Jan 82 (signed to press 2 Nov 81) pp 124-125

[Report by Prof Dr Frank Fiedler, Department of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy, Karl Marx University, Leipzig: "Creation of the Department of 'Marxist-Leninist Philosophy' at Karl Marx University, Leipzig"]

[Text] Effective 1 September 1981, the new "Marxist-Leninist Philosophy" section was created along with the "Scientific Communism" section at the Karl Marx University, Leipzig. At a ceremony on 18 September 1981, Prof Dr G Engel, deputy minister for university and technical school affairs, presented the founding documents to Karl Marx University rector Prof Dr L Rathmann. The significance of this scientific-political event was underscored by the presence of Prof Dr E Hahn, chairman of the scientific council for Marxist-Leninist philosophy in the GDR, and a number of other personalities representing scientific and social life of our country. In his official address, Prof Dr Engel had words of praise for the work done by the "Marxist-Leninist Philosophy/Scientific Communism" section which has been in existence since 1968 and voiced the hope that the two new sections would help establish even closer ties between science and political life; between Marxist-Leninist theory and revolutionary practice, and between education, research and the development of cadres.

The establishment of the "Marxist-Leninist Philosophy" section ushers in a new phase of the 30-year history of teaching philosophy students at Karl Marx University, Leipzig. In contrast to the philosophy sections at the universities of Berlin, Halle and Jena, this training will continue under the basic course of study for "teachers of Marxism-Leninism." This is the basic objective of the section—to give priority to training cadres in the field of dialectical and historical materialism for basic studies in Marxism-Leninism.

In research, too, the section will continue working along previously defined lines—in the fields of epistemology and historical materialism. Research into the history of philosophy and in logic will be continued. Research into materialist dialectics as a philosophical method and theory is to be intensified.

Based on the training and research profile, the new philosophy section encompasses five disciplines: dialectical materialism; historical materialism; epistemology; history of philosophy, and logic. On the occasion of the foundation of the section, a scientific conference on "Philosophy and Political Life" was held on 9 October 1981 which established the guidelines for future operations. The conference also made it plain that the collective of the newly formed section stands ready to make a substantial contribution to fulfilling the tasks set for our republic's social scientists by the 10th party congress of the SED.

9478
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THEATER CRITICIZED FOR INDIFFERENCE TO 'POLITICALLY-ORIENTED' DRAMAS

West German Commentary

Bonn IWE-TAGESDIENST in German No 20, 18 Feb 82 'iwe-kultur' supplement

[Report from Berlin: "GDR Dramatists Shun Conflicts." A translation of the East Berlin THEATER DER ZEIT article cited below follows this commentary]

[Text] The East Berlin magazine THEATER DER ZEIT (No 2, 1982) has criticized the noticeable reticence of GDR dramatists to deal with touchy themes and social conflict. "Politically-oriented drama" which tackles the crucial issues of our time directly is too much of a rarity. Many dramatists, the magazine says, "mistakenly think they are being asked to gloss over, to treat superficially and to avoid conflict" whenever they are called upon to turn to present-day themes. The authors are also not encouraged enough to deal with conflict and perhaps the time has come for the GDR to throw "some antiquated conceptions" of contradiction and conflict overboard.

GDR Theater Magazine's Analysis

East Berlin THEATER DER ZEIT in German Vol 37 No 2, Feb 82 (signed to press 22 Dec 81) pp 6-7

['TdZ Kolumne' feature article by Hans-Rainer John, chief editor, THEATER DER ZEIT: "To Master the Central Topic." A translation of the Dec 81 THEATER DER ZEIT article cited below is published under the heading, "Dramatists Urged Not to Neglect Sociopolitical Issues," in JPRS 80054, 2 Feb 82, No 1973 of this series, pp 1-4]

[Text] In the lead article of our December issue, Christoph Funke criticized the theaters. He attacked them for not paying enough heed to our best dramatic works. I agree with him. They do not occupy a focal position in our repertoires. As far as I can tell, the way our theaters deal with the authors leaves something to be desired in any event. New plays, for example, are examined to determine whether they fit in with existing plans. But it is unusual to provide the author eager for some comment with news on the outcome of the examination. If the author is not told what the theater and the audience want, the gap continues to widen. In many instances, the practice of suggesting certain subject matter has been discontinued. That is unfortunate. If Heiner Mueller's "Construction Site" had not been commissioned, it would not have been written.

My view is that this wait-and-see attitude of so many theaters should give way to increased activity stemming from a feeling of joint reponsibility.

In addition the Funke's article pleading the authors' case, the above-mentioned issue contained reviews of "Jaeckel's Dream," "August Caesar," "All Or Something" and "The Tripping Rooster." Toward the back of the magazine, a theater was sought that would premiere Koerbl's "Double Murder in the Rue Morgue" and then there were the texts of the one-act plays "The Tailor of Ulm" and "Don Juan." Reading through all this, one comes to the conclusion that these works—although one could think of them as little dots of color on the broad palette of contemporary drama—cannot be used as the core of an entire repertory but should really be performed in studio theaters. Farces, fairy tales, historical pieces, charades, parables and detective stories could be cited as evidence of the diversity of drama, if and only if topical plays dealing with central topics constituted the core of the repertory. But we are (still) a long way from that.

Politically-oriented dramas are far too much of a rarity; dramas that deal directly with the crucial issues of our time which touch on everyone and that are conscious of the fact that the portrayal of the working class is at the heart of artistic progress. There is nothing to be said against clowns and synthetic characters on stage or against animals and outsiders but audience interest after all focuses on vivid characters alive with the contradictions of present-day life. The claim by society to see itself represented in art is no doubt legitimate. But it is not being taken into consideration sufficiently. Why is that ?

I think that whenever there is a call to turn to the present, to reveal the heroism inherent in everyday life, the dramatists mistakenly think they are merely being asked to gloss over, to treat superficially and to avoid conflict. But any dramatist who assumes the point of view of the organizing, leading power of society is by no means obligated to limit himself to portraying a happy and altogether "wholesome" world or to try for a happy end at all costs. If he did, that would indeed result in boredom, petty bourgeois self-contentedness and insignificant drama.

Drama lives by conflict. It was only after Soviet drama overcame the no-conflict theory that it regained its strength and significance. But anyone who believes that differences of opinion on substantive issues or that debate and discussion make for conflict will have a difficult time reaching an audience. Rudolf Floss, the writer, once said "that many a person lives dangerously today by trying to do a better job than he did before. In this way, he shows up his colleagues which is something they do not like at all. Thus, anyone who wants to achieve something new that has not been done before and that cannot be officially sanctioned beforehand cannot properly hope to be caressed for it. Now that is not deplorable. In fact, it is quite normal. /In our country, too, no one makes it big without a struggle./

In literature, these inexorable struggles cannot be replaced by unpleasantnesses or by see-sawing between the good, the not-so-good and the somewhat-bad, Floss said—and the fact is that he does not write plays. Now if that is a problem in epic writing, it becomes an almost existential problem in dramatic writing, since drama must have conflict. Tendryakov once said that an Othello who was /normally/ jealous and does /not/ strangle Desdemona would be an extremely moderate character who would elicit no more than mediocre responses and no great emotions. "The acuity of the problem calls for characters with conflicts. Conflict is the basis of the artistic merit of any given work...Unsatisfactory, grey, insignificant works are those that are incapable of carrying certain problems forward until they reach the conflict stage." Gelman said much the same thing and Gorky made this comment: "Art sets itself the goal of exaggerating—both the good in order that it should become even better and the bad which is hostile to man and which disfigures him in order that it should arouse loathing."

Perhaps we have at times not encouraged our authors sufficiently to proceed along these lines. Perhaps we pointed them to a "middle-of-the-road" kind of truth that did not sufficiently take the essence and the possibilities inherent in art into account. "The fictions which every art must have are so poorly understood by all those," Goethe said, "who wish everything that is true to be natural and thereby rip art out of its proper sphere." Perhaps we ourselves harbor some antiquated notions concerning contradictions and conflicts which we ought to throw overboard. It should not be risky to take up complex problems of our life—provided, of course, that we do so using socialist positions as our point of departure.

The best Soviet dramatic works could point the way in terms of method. What are their characteristics ? Toughness most of all and the heightening of conflict; the courage to pose sharp questions, to uncover contradictions in socialist reality so as to contribute to resolving them. Then there is the substantive and professional know-how, the familiarity of the authors with the sphere of life they are writing about and which merely serves as a backdrop for the personality problem at the center of things. The relationships between the individual and society are not viewed merely from the subjective standpoint but also in terms of objective reciprocal contingencies. And then there is their consistent, pitiless way of not accepting any taboos on issues or functions where the life styles of the working class are concerned; the communist point of view which serves as the basis for an impassioned attack against everything that holds up the progress of society. There is no skepticism there or criticism for its own sake which puts some distance between itself and the historical process. Social activity is stimulated and there is the joyous belief in the "perfectability of human destiny through society." And Brecht's call is answered that "the struggle of the new with the old... should not only be the subject matter of the play but its consequence as well." As we well know, that is why these plays have elicited a great deal of response both in our theaters and among our audiences.

I wish that this might encourage our authors to make a direct commitment to the exciting processes of the realization—full of conflict as it is—of socialist ideas in real life. Most certainly, this is the shortest and most effective route to contributing to expressing the attitudes toward life which have their origin in the ideals of the working class.

9478
CSO: 2300/188

SED BOOK ON 'SOCIALIST GERMAN NATION' REVIEWED

East Berlin DER NATIONALE DEMOKRAT in German No 12, Dec 81 (signed to press 26 Nov 81) pp 45-46

["Our Socialist Nation in the GDR--An Irreversible Reality"--Review by Dr Fred Dumke, director, Central Party School; of book, in the series "Critique of Bourgeois Ideology," by Prof Dr Walter Schmidt, director, Institute for History of German Labor Movement, Academy of Social Sciences, SED Central Committee. For various references to discussions of the same and related subjects see translations of articles by other GDR authors, published under the heading, "Development of Nation-Nationality Concept Analyzed," in JPRS 79645, 11 Dec 81, No 1950 Of this series, pp 48-55]

[Text] This 106-page monograph was published in 1980 as the 99th volume of the internationally esteemed series "Critique of Bourgeois Ideology" under the direction of Manfred Buhr through the Akademie-Verlag, Berlin. The work, with a wealth of information and argument, makes the point that understanding history in its factual and objective course, in its totality of dialectic, is congruent with working class values. To grasp it as a history of class struggle does not equate a constraint but rather genuine insight into the actual course of things, into historical connections and objective patterns. History, heritage and tradition are essentially determined by classes and their struggles. The author begins with the historical reality in mind: on the territory of the former "German Reich" there have existed for more than 30 years two basically different, independent and sovereign states with contrasting social systems--our socialist GDR and the imperialist FRG. In his introduction the author asserts the scientific perception that the socialist German nation has developed with the socialist revolution, with the shaping of socialist society based upon its own integral principles, while in the FRG the old bourgeois nation has continued to exist based upon the social principles of capitalism (ibid. p 7). This principle had been established as early as 1971 by the secretary-general of the central committee of the SED, Erich Honecker, at the Eighth SED congress. To summarize, "As far as the question of nationality is concerned, history has already made that decision." There is then no "open German question."

The same forces, which fear for a loss of their monopoly-capitalistic power bases in the FRG and who have for decades worked systematically to destroy the unity of the German nation, are now, ever since the collapse of the Hallstein-

doctrine at the end of the 1960's, hypocritically laying claim to the title of guardian and defender of a "national unity of all Germans." What has now come onto the center stage of FRG propaganda is the doctrine of a purportedly "unitary German nation" that has continued to exist since the GDR and the FRG stand in a "special relationship" to each other as "two states of one nation" and with which the "German question" is to be kept "an open one." Influential circles in the FRG are hoping that such historically determined factors as the origins of German history, the common language and the commonalities of culture as well as family relationships can be used to do away with our socialist GDR. In this situation attitudes toward the question of nationality become a central issue in the ideological confrontation between socialism and imperialism.

It is from this background that the discussion of the relationship of nation and history has taken on new dimensions. Bourgeois ideologists in the FRG believed that they could achieve significant support for the official Bonn doctrine of the purported "unity of the German nation" and be able to confront the historical reality, legitimately confirmed by the GDR, of two contrasting German nations, basically different in their societal character.

The discussion which was carried on in the GDR through the 1970's regarding the relationships of nation, history, heritage and tradition were concentrated, as the author shows, on three major complexes of problems:

1. Efforts to reassess and reintegrate the role of the German Reich from 1871 to 1945 within the development of the German nation;

2. Increased concern with the so-called "pre-national-state" era of German history, i.e. with the thousand years of German history between the evolution of the German people as an ethnic unit in the 10th century and the creation of the bourgeois German national State in 1971;

3. The arguments concerning the consequences of independent and societally different processes of development in the GDR and the FRG upon the status of the nation (pp 8/9).

The author very convincingly lays to rest, by careful use of many important sources, the revanchist variants of the FRG's doctrine of national unity. In the course of this, many individual questions are dealt with, such as: "The Founding of the Reich of 1871--High Point Or Episode Of German History?" (p 11ff.). Another chapter is concerned with the prehistory and evolution of the bourgeois nation (pp 24 ff.) and makes it clear that distinctions must be made between people, nationality and nation. The German people had come into being in the 10th century, the process of development of a bourgeois German nation only began at the end of the 15th century with the creation of capitalistic relationships and the early bourgeois German revolution of 1517 to 1526 and extended into the second third of the 19th century, founding of the Reich 1971! (p. 26).

At the same time the phases in the evolution of the bourgeois German nation are dealt with. The author shows how the concept of a German nationality, that had come into being as early as feudalism, lead to the development of

the various independent bourgeois nations; the Dutch nation, Switzerland and Austria (34 ff.). Very informative is the treatment of the role mass movements, especially during 1517-1526, 1813-1815, 1848/49 and through the 1860's.

One reads with great interest the argumentation regarding the historical basis of the GDR. "Genuine socialism on German soil can only be understood historically as the end-product of the totality of German history" (p 56), and, moreover, in a three-fold connection: chronological, territorial and socio-structural. The history of the GDR does not begin only in 1949 or 1945--the historical roots of our GDR extend far back into German history to the time of the evolution of the German people, back into primitive society. Socialism in our country has evolved out of the almost 150 year-long struggle of the revolutionary German labor movement.

The historical roots of our socialist German nation do not, of course, exist only on that part of German territory where socialism is already a reality. Our evolving socialist nation must, in the end, take into account all of German history in all its contradictions, in its dialectic, in its class struggles between progress and reaction. Particularly, however, the GDR now for several decades has a comprehensive history of its own with a historically new character. Our republic is the legitimate end product and the crowning of the centuries-long struggle of progressive forces of German history for a humanistic German state. It stands in the line of continuity of everything progressive, revolutionary and humanistic in the entire, thousand-year course of German history.

The GDR and the FRG have, of course, both evolved from German history. The GDR from the struggle of progressive forces against reaction while the FRG continues in the reactionary line of the ruling classes of the exploitative society. History itself shows: historical traditions have class character. The revanchist FRG thesis of a "common history of the German people" is untenable in the light of the irreversible realities of the last three decades upon German soil. This FRG thesis cannot obscure the fact that the objective relationship of the two German states is totally at odds even with respect to the past, to history. There is in this regard no "open German question" (pp 64 ff.). This is categorically underscored by the socialist consciousness of the people of the FRG with regard to the state, history and the nation (pp 78 ff.).

This new, socialist substance in the history of the GDR serves to mark even more clearly the independence of its society, state and nation. A clear demarcation between socialism and imperialism has been drawn on German soil, and there has come into being the commonality of the GDR with the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community. "The progress towards socialism on German soil and with that the creation of a socialist German nation in the GDR is irreversible" (p 88).

This timely work by Walter Schmidt is a very valuable contribution to its theme of class struggles in our time on German soil. It presents a great deal of new material and can be an important ideological guide for us who are allied with the working classes and their party.

9878
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BOOK ON 'CITIZENS' RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES IN SOCIALIST SOCIETY' REVIEWED

Potsdam-Babelsberg STAAT UND RECHT in German Vol 30 No 12, Dec 81 (signed to press 22 Oct 81) pp 1133-1136

[Review by Prof Dr Ingo Wagner, Department of Jurisprudence, Karl Marx University, Leipzig; of book "Grundrechte des Buergers in der sozialistischen Gesellschaft" (The Citizen's Basic Rights in the Socialist Society)--published by Staatsverlag der DDR, East Berlin, 1980, 308 pp--collectively authored under the supervision of Prof Dr Eberhard Poppe, Department of Political Science and Jurisprudence, Martin Luther University, Halle-Wittenberg; member, GDR Academy of Sciences]

[Text] This book, collectively authored under the supervision of Eberhard Poppe, in its first chapter deals with questions of the relations between society and personality and of the citizens' basic rights and basic duties in the GDR's socialist social and political system. Then follow, in the second chapter, thoughts about the development, content and functions of the constitutionally guaranteed basic citizens rights and duties in the GDR. The third chapter is devoted to the guarantees of the citizens' basic rights and the demands placed on the activity of the people's representations and social organizations. Problems of the basic rights and duties of the socialist community of states follow in the fourth chapter. The fifth and final chapter discusses questions of the socialist basic rights in their relation to democratic international law.

The authors' collective has produced an extensive and most relevant work presenting to the reader in an exemplary fashion important questions concerning the rights and freedoms of the citizens of socialist society. Among other things, the authors have succeeded in establishing vividly the existence and need of constitutionally guaranteed basic citizens rights and duties. Not only have they managed to summarize and popularize all the knowledge established about the subject, they also offer many new scientific insights which are indicative of their creative and fruitful work and also define the approach to future research. Future projects should try to disclose commensurate objective inevitabilities in our legal superstructure. What deserves special recognition in this context is that they did not leave out the structuring of a legal set of concepts as a method for gaining further knowledge. An example is their interesting discussion of the legal status of the socialist personality (p 38). Pronoses on the constitutional position of the citizens in the European countries of the socialist community complete that component (pp 236 ff).

Among the advantages of the book furthermore is its coming to grips consistently with the bourgeois ideology and practice of law. The authors convincingly show that research in jurisprudence must also always include an examination of questions in the historic development of the elements in the legal superstructure. The historic disgression into the history of the basic rights and basic duties in the GDR undergirds the realization that only socialism truly brings to realization the human rights and freedoms and that the basic citizens rights in socialist society play a significant role in this. Cogently and objectively, the authors make critical comments on mistaken positions in the discussion of socialist basic rights (pp 24 f). The language and style of the presentation also helps facilitate the right understanding. For all these reasons one should hope the book will be read by a broad circle of readers. Especially party and state functionaries, social scientists and any other citizens interested in it could garner many suggestions and insights from it.

The book, of course, also raises some problems and evokes some critical objections in this context. The following comments are meant mainly as suggestions for future research in this field. First, it seems necessary to strengthen its theoretical cogency. The essential structural element of jurisprudence is the system of theoretical knowledge. That calls for always giving proper attention to raising the metholological potency of statements in jurisprudence. The authors of the present work do not use all opportunities available to them. That may be briefly explained with respect to the unity of basic rights and basic duties and to the constitutionally guaranteed basic rights as subjective rights.

The law in socialism as such ultimately serves the personality development, and this also then by means of basic rights and basic duties. The authors have most cogently connected the content and functions of the basic rights with the basic duties and thereby displayed the unity of rights and duties. Yet it seems necessary to me to shed more light on what is specific in these legal manifestations--also within the scope of the present work, which emphasizes the basic rights.

Altogether in technical literature dealing with the unity of rights and duties, it is more or less being ignored that we are dealing, on the one side, with legal rights and with duties, on the other. It is often being said that human rights and duties form objectively, that the process through which they evolve historically conforms with the formation of personality, that they exist in a new quality in socialism, and so forth. But the question about the why of rights and duties is hardly ever raised.

This is a deficiency that can also be found in the present work. But if one fails to disclose the specifics that come with it--or looks at them in a one-sided or superficial manner--, one cannot sufficiently penetrate the inseparable dialectical unity of rights and duties nor adequately disclose their prognostic development in the further construction of communist society. On the one side, basic rights and basic duties are, in a manner that is in principle correct, related to the objective inevitabilities in society (p 63), but then comes a certain reduction of what is socially necessary to binding regulations by basic duties (p 80).

That the authors think that the socialist basic rights are also subjective rights, is an advance, because in political science the basic rights are in fact treated mainly as objective right only, and there are even scientists that admit no subjective rights to this branch of law. The authors can, of course, not be expected to allude to all the consequences resulting from it for further research in constitutional law, yet one should have wished for more than merely affirming the basic rights' being also subjective rights.

"The socialist basic rights and basic duties conform to objective social inevitabilities, are objective law, because they orient the citizens to socially necessary and possible conduct, to a behavior that is indispensable for the development of society as for the citizen himself" (p 61). Here the remark should be made that this observation at the same time applies to the constitutionally guaranteed subjective right in general which, as the right of personality, is a specific legal-social measure of man's individuation and socialization in the construction of communist society. For that reason, the affirmation of basic rights also as subjective rights should not so much be derived from settling partial contradictions, conflict between partners, claims an individual may have and so forth (p 67), but one should rather look at the role subjective right plays as a delineated area in normative terms of personal freedom in the individual's connection with society--his individuation and socialization.

If we accept personality, endowed with subjective rights, individuated and realized in the exercise, through subjective rights, of the modes of conduct which the socialist state sets down and guarantees as objective law, for future research on constitutional law, it seems to me, subjective rights must receive major attention in the following aspects: (a) The social content of subjective right, nourished, as social freedom, out of objective requirements; (b) the citizens' individual law consciousness--the awareness of norms--, as subjective right is internalized through appropriation by personality at uneven degrees and is itself further developed depending on any given state of awareness; and (c) subjective right as behavioral reality.

By means of such research, new editions could eliminate another basic fault of the work: Its somewhat weak empirical base as shown in the presentation of the implementation of the basic rights. It is correct, of course, that most citizens exercise their basic rights consciously and socialistically, but there are already differences in the positive motives for the highest level in the exercise of socialist rights. An habitual use of basic rights can mark a higher level of intellectual human development as the outcome of realizing the moral content of certain modes of conduct, but it may also attest to a lower state of awareness, and so forth. Such (and other) problems enter the scientific field of vision through exploring basic rights as subjective rights.

Furthermore, there are many individual matters in this monograph calling for further specification or causing objections. The book does not extensively reflect, it seems to me, the status of philosophic-sociological knowledge relating to the social determination of the position of personality. The relation between constitutional right and human right, which is presented unequivocally in the last chapter, has to be rendered somewhat more precise in the opening of the book.

One should also give more thought to certain qualitative components of basic rights, e.g. the right to peace. The management component of basic rights and basic duties ought to be deepened, and so forth.

Nonetheless, this book introduces a higher level of research on the basic socialist rights, which deserves to be acknowledged and appreciated.

5885
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KOPECZI DEFINES NEW CONSERVATISM

Budapest KRITIKA in Hungarian Oct 81 pp 11-12

[Article by Bela Kopeczi: "The Conservative New-Wave and Socialism"]

[Text] Our sincere congratulations to academician Bela Kopeczi on the occasion of his 60th birthday.

We cannot deny the fact, that the global problems facing the world, the economic and value-system crises accompanying them, the often sharp internal contradictions, and at the same time, the legitimate determination to preserve the achievements attained so far may provide fertile ground for the development of conservative attitude and behavioral forms, even in the socialist countries. While these forms reflect present interests, they also borrow from the past; from a historical view which focuses not on revolutionary traditions, but rather on traditionalistic or conservative reform endeavors.

Conservatism in Hungary has a rich past. I am not talking about the old, noblemen's conservatism which characterized Hungarian political thinking for such a long time, or about the retrograde nationalist view, the pro-independence and pro-Habsburg versions of which appeared simultaneously after 1867, whose aim was to bring about a form of capitalism that was filled with feudal traditions and to ensure Hungarian superiority. Today, it is more worthwhile to examine those traditions which stand closer to the new conservatism. During the first half of the 19th century, it was not only the absolutist reaction and its Hungarian followers that tried to organize against bourgeois liberalism, but also the so-called new conservatives. In 1839, their leader, Aurel Desswffy, submitted their program to Chancellor Metternich, which represented the interests of the aristocracy and the wealthy landowners with medium sized estates without turning down certain reforms. Thus, they were ready to accept the idea of limited taxation for the nobility and the curtailment of megye self-government, but the way expected this syncretism to materialize was partly through economic compensation, and partly by seeking accommodation with the absolutist system. They criticized the rapid advancement of capitalism in Hungary, and in this respect they liked to turn to the arguments of romantic criticism of capitalism in Western Europe.

The new conservatists' syncretic attempts failed, but some of their ideas were carried on by Istvan Szechenyi, and in general, by the pro-reform aristocratic

minority which advocated limited bourgeois development. The way the followers of this trend wanted to liven up the domestic economic life was by developing the large estates, and by investing the income generated by those estates into industry and transportation; they were, however, unwilling to tamper with the existing political conditions. Within this framework, they also recommended reforms, such as the general and proportional taxation, the abolition of entailment, equality before the law and universal conscription, all of which were contradicted feudal privileges. We have to add here that, taking the legacy of enlightenment further, Szechenyi and his fellow reformers attributed great significance to the development of science and education, and to the dissemination of culture.

This concept was in contradiction with the liberal bourgeois policy of Lajos Kossuth and the gentry, which considered the country's political transformation, the reexamination of its ties with Austria and the realization of a certain degree of national independence to be the preconditions of economic and cultural development.

For a long time, the development of Hungarian political thinking was determined by a contrast between carefully weighed progress and radical, or more radical change, and the effects of this can still be felt today. After the collapse of the 1848-1849 revolution, it seemed natural for the various conservative trends to gain strength, and here again, I am talking not about their most reactionary forms, but about those which did not preclude the necessity or the possibility of certain reforms. Among the representatives of this type of reform-conservatism was Zsigmond Kemeny, whose direct aim was to try to prove that the Hungarian had an instinctive aversion for anything revolutionary, and he carried this as far as to claim that Lajos Kossuth was not a real Hungarian. This was an argument which later, following the fall of the Soviet Republic, was advocated by groups other than merely those on the far right. In Kemeny's opinion, the preservation of the Habsburg empire was of vital necessity, although he did not agree with the retrograde social efforts of ultra-conservative circles.

The type of liberalism that had laid the groundwork for the compromise, was not that far from the position taken by reform-conservatism. In his work which appeared between 1851 and 1854, entitled "The Influence of the Prevailing Ideas of the 19th Century on the Present Situation," the former centralist, Jozsef Eotvos, whose international viewpoint was the broadest among his group, stood up in defense of human rights as an advocate of bourgeois constitutionalism, but he did so feeling apprehensive about the specter of a take-over by democratic forces. Eotvos spoke out against the excessive state power, and did so in the name of the very principles of liberty, equality and nationality, referring of course to the Habsburg state; at the same time, however, he hoped that this state would also play a restrictive, equalizing and, of course, repressive role as soon as these human rights, as interpreted by him, were threatened. His thinking was focused on the relationship between individual freedom and centralization, and it was this relationship which he tried to syncretize; however, he failed to see the connection between individual freedom and economic requirements. His state--as he envisioned it--would not strive for "universal" equality, or even for providing the individual with the enjoyment of material and moral benefits; all it had to do was to guarantee these benefits, i.e. to ensure private property. His criticism of communism was also connected with the question of equality, for in

his opinion the only way the kind of equality professed by communism could be achieved was through subjugation of the individual by the state. "It is not the victory of communist principles which is impossible--he wrote--, but the idea that those principles can someday be achieved by forces other than those of absolutism." The vindication of equality, therefore, would lead to the omnipotence of the state, and would threaten the bourgeois concept of human rights.

The liberalism which became predominant in Hungary after 1867 was not of the pure bourgeois variety; much rather, it was the kind which we could call conservative liberalism and which asserted itself in so many different forms in other, mainly Central European countries. It was in this Hungary, filled with vestiges of feudalism, where due to the weakness of the bourgeoise it was impossible to pursue a bourgeois liberal policy, that Ferenc Deak and his followers decided to make an economic, political as well as cultural compromise. Precisely for this reason, Gyula Szekfu's claim blaming Hungary's misfortunes on liberalism, seems to be an over-statement of the facts. His partiality was so great, that in his far-reaching work, entitled "The Three Generations and What Will Follow," he went as far as to accuse Istvan Tisza of being a liberal. It was Tisza's concept of nation and state which he attributed to liberalism, but he also blamed him for "not dedicating his energies and crystal-clear character to serving higher causes that went beyond the sphere of Parliament, such as trying to prevent the exodus, saving the gentry class and working to strengthen and consolidate the national intelligentsia." In view of all this, it is understandable then why he considered bourgeois radicalism and Marxism, which in his opinion was an alien ideology transplanted from outside, to be the most reprehensible manifestations of liberal development.

These views of Szekfu were adopted by a segment of the Hungarian ruling class, which announced the program of neo-nationalism, and with it the program of neo-conservatism, and used Istvan Szechenyi and his work to carry out an ideological reconstruction which was not nearly enough to satisfy the majority of the ruling class, or the various Hungarian trends connected with European rightist movements.

In the introduction of his book, written in July 1920, Szekfu was still calling for the socio-economic organization of national forces in an international environment which took for granted that "throughout their history, the Hungarian people had been an integral part of the Christian-Germanic cultural community." When in 1933, he issued a new expanded edition of his book, he had to concede that he had been chasing the illusion of naive nationalism, because the neo-baroque society of the Horthy system had failed to realize his ideas. The worst kind of conservatism had come to assert itself in Hungary that rejected all reforms. Once again, he began to advocate reform-conservatism: "the synthesis of reform and preservation, innovation and tradition will help Hungarians to be better Hungarians." This is what he thought was being realized in the works of Bela Bartok, Zoltan Kodaly and Janos Horvath. This illusion was also to be destroyed by historical development, the Hungarian ruling class would continue to refuse to undertake the reforms recommended by Szekfu, and it would not only tie its fate to fascism, but would produce a political force that was even farther to the right. It was Szekfu himself, who after the end of World War II would proceed to criticize the "middle class," exposing its incompetence.

The purpose of this short historical review was to call your attention to the fact that Hungarian traditions include the antecedents of not only the most extreme forms of conservatism, but also of the position advocating syncretism between conservatism and liberalism. The reason this deserves attention is because many of the elements of today's neo-conservatism which is making itself felt in various parts of the world, can also be found--taking into account, of course, the differences of the times and circumstances--in the Hungarian trends, especially in those which emerged after World War I, but some of which have precedents going back even further. Also not without interest are the forms in which the often reinterpreted and updated ideological elements of these precedents are found in the conservative moods appearing in Hungary today. It is not by accident, we feel, that the activities of Istvan Szechenyi, Ferenc Deak, Gyula Szekfu, and the debates centered around them, have received so much attention recently in Hungarian public thinking. We believe, that the explanation for this lies not only in the one-sided historiography of the 1950's, which stressed our independence-loving and revolutionary traditions and which we want to replace now with a more balanced picture of history that more closely reflects the historical truth and our actual development; this phenomenon is also connected with the deeper currents of today's social and ideological development.

In 1956, socialism in Hungary was in danger. Based on the progress we have seen since then, however, we can say we have proven that socialism can endure crises, that it is capable of development and that it is able to renew itself. Many have tried to attribute the success of this policy exclusively to our ability to adjust to reality, to our economic reforms and to our emphasis on pragmatic methods. Obviously, these features do appear in our practice, but it would be completely one-sided to refuse to see the great importance of the kind of political-ideological analysis which we have used to examine the consequences of dogmatism, of the struggle between dogmatism and revisionism and of the influence of other bourgeois trends, and to draw the theoretical conclusions that have served as the basis of our renewal. We could argue, and with good reason, about the thoroughness and depth with which the scientific analysis of our economic, social and cultural development has been carried out, but no-one can deny that even in theory, the main directions of our renewal have already evolved.

The reason this must be especially stressed, is because the development and renewal capability of our socialism as it exists is a constantly talked-about subject in debates not only against the new conservatism and the new right, but also against the various liberal bourgeois and social-democratic ideas. A typical example of this is one of the latest books of the liberal French sociologist, Maurice Duveryer, which he has given a title that closely concerns us: "The Orange Trees of Lake Balaton" (Les oranges du lac Balaton). In it, he attempts to prove that Marxism is not a science, and that socialism as it exists is inconsistent with reality. To support his argument, he cites the anecdote about the time when under Rakosi the political leadership ordered the planting of orange trees on the shores of Lake Balaton, even though the agronomist in charge of the project had scientifically founded reservations. The plantation was destroyed by frost, and the agronomist was sentenced for sabotage, because the party--"as the interpreter of historical materialism which is the expression of scientific truth"--could not be wrong. In his analysis of "totalitarian socialism," the author does not revert

to what actually has happened in Hungary since the early 1950's; he does, however, theoretically claim, by presenting the point of view of political democracy and pluralism as absolute, that socialism cannot renew itself. In his last sentence he justifies his pessimism, which extends not only to socialism but to the entire future of humanity, and adds that he would like it better if he could have said that "the orange trees were able to develop on the shores of Lake Balaton." Perhaps he should have looked at the flourishing vineyards, the transformed villages and the relatively well-to-do people there; these also could be considered symbols of the renewal of socialism.

Our post-1956 development proves that it is capable of renewal, and not only in practice, but also in theory. Political interests may hinder the drawing of theoretical conclusions, although perhaps from time to time their weight is overly great, thus hampering the development of ideological work and especially the satisfaction of the spiritual needs of our intelligentsia. Bolder theoretical work could help to further clarify the development tendencies of the past quarter of a century, among them, naturally, also the problems of today's Marxism.

Today we are witnessing the emergence of views which equate ideology with dogmatism, and which fear that by trying to draw theoretical conclusions from practice and by confronting them with the basic categories of Marxism, we are in effect providing arguments for a policy that prevents us from taking into account actual processes and carrying out necessary reforms. Reform policies are instruments of the development of socialist society which, of course, do not necessarily have to be limited exclusively to the economy. The experiences of the past decades indicate that one-sidedness in any form can only lead to serious consequences. For the economy cannot develop without the unfolding of socialist democracy, or without people who accept its scientific, humane and communal system of values. Developing and implementing a complex reform policy which takes into account several factors and some broad interrelationships is not an easy task in a society which does not have fully evolved automatisms that would, at least partly, regulate its economic processes, in which the means for providing political solutions to conflicts are not given, and in which conscience-inspired and often very subjective and voluntaristic factors play a great role.

Let us add to all this, that in the 1960's the country, which after so many shocks was finally able to live in peace, and which was able now to pay more attention to economic construction as well as to the enrichment of the individual, welcomed the benefits of stabilization. The positive aspects of this stabilization should by no means be underrated, for even today they continue to serve as the main source of trust. Yet, we must concede, that this one-sidedly interpreted stability has led to a certain rigidity both in our institutional system and in our way of thinking, and it has resulted in a kind of attitude in practice which is unprepared to handle changes. One consequence of this was that both our leadership and public opinion were caught off-guard by the symptoms of the international economic crisis which began to appear after 1973, and by the effects of that crisis on Hungary. The first reaction to these changes was to use our old, discredited methods to find a way out. During the second half of the 1970's, our attention was focused once again on the reforms that had been launched in 1968 with the introduction of the new economic mechanism; however, today it is generally believed that if new ground is to be broken, the importance of the human factor cannot be ignored.

A segment of the public opinion still has not understood the changes that have occurred, or the new requirements that are facing us, and continues to want to preserve its own standard of living without making any concessions. This conservatism in the public mood must also be considered when we talk about the importance of ideological work. For ideological apathy only helps to reinforce this "popular conservatism," this unyielding insistence to hang onto the things already achieved, which is neither in the individual's nor in the public's interest anymore if after a certain amount of time, the reforms are not realized then our previous achievements are also threatened.

When we talk about ideology, we are talking about a system of ideas which combines not only knowledge about the world, about society and individuals, but also feelings and thoughts which help to increase and enrich the awareness of the various strata, groups and individuals concerning their interests, and which help to determine their value system and also their attitudes and actions. Why should we forego an ideological activity which helps to call our attention to this important prerequisite of personality-development, i.e. to the importance of having a world outlook? Why should we be indifferent to the need to develop a kind of social consciousness promoting communal cohesiveness which affects the relationship between the individual and society, the development of democracy and the strengthening of the ne national idea? And why would there not be a need now even from the point of view of everyday life to increase people's awareness toward our economic, political and cultural activities, thereby helping to develop an open, reform-minded and progressive stand?

There are some forms of conservatism presently manifesting themselves in Hungary which are reminiscent of certain similar phenomena found in developed capitalist countries. By conservatism I mean those attempts aimed at reviving dogmatism, which use the sharpening of the international class struggle as their chief explanation for our existing difficulties, and which consider the consciousness factors as the only possible solutions to those problems. Conservatism, in my opinion, includes all attempts aimed at reviving nationalism, even if they are conceived as the results of national preservationist sentiments and even if, due partly to the deterioration of moral norms and partly to the development of the fate of Hungarians living outside our borders and to the domestic reaction toward them, they are concerned about the loosening of our national cohesion. Here again, what we are doing in fact is pushing the objective factors into the background, and by doing so, we are abandoning the only realistic way of strengthening our country. Just as conservative, in my opinion, are those pro-reformist trends which underrate the importance of the consciousness factors and are content with accepting one of the versions of the economist, technocratic view, when similar forms of these concepts have already been discarded by the developed capitalist countries, and when development has proven--in connection with the introduction of the reform of our economic mechanism, among other things--the significance of political and ideological factors. Neither one nor the other form of conservatism can be justified by looking back at our ancestors.

The world-wide ideological reconstruction attempts of the new conservatism and the new right have made it possible for us to assess our own situation and tasks in the area of ideology. Their general, or I could say, frontal attack on Marxism

has had the advantage of clearly enhancing the differences that exist between Marxism and other trends. The new conservatives have taken the concept of dialectical and historical materialism, and have made it a part of a long development process which from the Greek philosophers to Marx includes the totality of progressive thinking. This frontal attack does not deal with questions of detail; instead, it questions one specific direction of the entire human development, including socialism as a whole. Under these circumstances it has become a domestic necessity underlined also by international factors to theoretically examine our own experiences, to further improve our ideology, to shape public thinking and to personalize and accept the requirements of consciousness. (This subject is discussed in greater detail in my book published by the Kossuth Publishing House, entitled "The New Conservatism and the New Left.")

9379
CSO: 2500/62

ZSMP MAIN BOARD SECRETARY INTERVIEWED

Warsaw SZTANDAR MLODYCH in Polish 25 Feb 82 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Krzysztof Janik, secretary of the main board, Union of Socialist Polish Youth (ZSMP) by Ryszard Naleszkiewicz: "What Kind of Poland, What Kind of Union"]

[Text] [Question] Ryszard Naleszkiewicz: You have begun a big discussion in the organization under the slogan "What kind of Poland, what kind of Union?". But before we state exactly what the subject matter of this action is, let us ask a fundamental question: How did the Union come out of these 16 months?

[Answer] Krzysztof Janik: I think we came out in better moral, mental and organizational shape than when we went in.

[Question] A bold statement. The facts, please.

[Answer] We went in with a hyped up, fictitious membership total, derived mainly by juggling the figures...

[Question] What was your official membership?

[Answer] Officially--two and a half million.

[Question] How much of this was fictional?

[Answer] The half million.

[Question] And then? For example, ZSMP membership cards turned in?

[Answer] This did not happen on a large scale. There was a certain increase before the Third Extraordinary Congress, when the Main Board was accused of passivity, apathy and unwillingness to act radically. After that, there was almost none of this. Some changed their colors, going over to the Polish Youth Union (ZMP) "Robotnik" ("Worker"). They were not happy about that fact that the party line won out at our Congress. They preferred to go with "Solidarity".

[Question] Were there many of these?

[Answer] At the most about 300 persons.

[Question] Let us go back to the question. How did the Union come out of these 16 months?

[Answer] We still do not have the results of a statistical questionnaire, but we believe that there are now considerably over a million and a half of us. Ultimately, we came out with a much more clearly defined ideological makeup. The Third Congress was of primary assistance here because of its political and ideological decisions. Finally, the fact of the existence of a state of martial law was a definite turning point, for it required self-determination. There was a barrier that had to be surmounted. Those who surmounted it--and after the imposition of martial law a very small number of membership cards were turned in, several dozen--spoke out clearly in favor of the ideological, programmatic and political principles. Possibly there is still a hidden, silent group, those biding their time, so we must reach them.

Finally, the Union came out with specific program principles. During those 16 months--this is positive--there was so much freedom to articulate desires, aspiration, expectations, that we now know what's what and can function programmically without a high probability of error.

[Question] How do you react to these expectations?

[Answer] We have formulated a program of five priorities: 1 - ideological and political education; 2 - a vocational start for the young farmer; 3 - housing construction; 4 - assistance to young married couples; and 5 - organization of free time, i.e., sports, recreation, culture. This is the program which we, as the Main Board, are presenting to the organization.

[Question] So again we have a program issued from the top, from the Main Board.

[Answer] Emanating from familiarity with the situation and not in the least rigid. If in some voivodship they set this up for themselves differently, then not only will we not hold it against them, but we will support them. Just so it conforms to their rules and expectations.

During the state of martial law we lost none of our old gains. We had several voivodship conferences where complete democracy prevailed. Except for one, we have had no cases where it was necessary to designate a commissioner-chairman of the voivodship board. The exception is Plock. The commissionership was determined not by political conditions, but by weather conditions, due to which a conference could not be held. In four voivodships, commissioner-secretaries of the voivodship board were appointed because it was not possible to call a plenum and action had to be taken. We are already making up for this. The same with authorities on the lower level.

[Question] What do you want to achieve in this first program campaign when you ask the young people "What kind of Poland do you want?"

[Answer] In our materials we are stating this question more precisely. What characteristics should this socialist Poland have? What avenues of approach should we use? What should be our input in the building of it?

[Question] This has been stipulated, demanded and expected many times.

[Answer] Exactly. That is the legacy of those 16 months. Following the example of both the party and "Solidarity", we learned how to word our demands in a categorical form. We want, we demand, give us, for if you don't we will... We want to change this style into the form: "we are giving you but help us, make it possible".

[Question] If you don't help us, we will not be able to give? Will we give anyway?

[Answer] No, we will not give. Society, certainly, is a two-way street! In this discussion we want to help work out some kind of vision of Poland in which crises would be avoided, because for the young the crisis is something more dangerous than for the older generation. The older generation has had "practice"--it has lived through several of these breakdowns and has developed an immunity. We do not want immunity and we don't want breakdowns.

[Question] What are the most important matters for future Poland, according to the Main Board? What do you want to discuss and what are you asking for?

[Answer] When we ask about the form of socialist Poland, we propose--I don't know whether our members will go along with us on this--that the discussion concentrate on the most important, in our opinion, problems. In our aspirations for the Poland of our future, we must implement the concept of social justice and equality. This means law and order, equal opportunity and equal responsibility. The second problem is the democratization of public life--returning the constitutional role to the Sejm and the people's councils, really establishing social control, not in the form of new institutions and bodies, but as a universal process in which everyone is both the controller and the controlled at the same time. Finally, the third set of matters takes in the good of the individual, the opportunity to share in the culture and educational advancement, the psychical self-fulfillment of an individual in his society.

[Question] What do you want to learn about the Union?

[Answer] Three things. What conditions should an organization have in order to effectively conduct ideological-educational work.

[Question] Should have. You can create those conditions yourself!

[Answer] It is the subjective role of the youth, not just the Union, in the state that is important. Its role and political importance. And not just at the top level, but also in the gmina, town, village, and in the workplace. This includes actual co-participation in authority, in access to culture. In short, to what extent are we to be self-dependent, and what kind of cadre policy should be conducted in the state.

We are referring to the promotion system, the vocational start, etc., i.e., the whole cadre policy as regards all workplaces in relation to actual talents, work and individual capabilities. For example, the matter of that magical work internship, which blocks the path of the young people and makes it impossible to make proper evaluations, not just where money is concerned, but also the attainment of positions, the full utilization of the capabilities of the best people.

[Question] What is the second question to which you want an answer?

[Answer] What conditions must the Union itself fulfill in order to effectively influence the youth? We must, therefore, state clearly what the concepts "political organization", "struggling organization", "open, multi-circle organization" mean... Finally, what does it mean to be an organization representing the interests of the youth.

[Question] Are you not taking the chance that the leaning will be towards the ideological side?

[Answer] We have more often been accused of leaning in the direction of a youth trade union, for the pressure on social matters during the crisis is especially great. In practice, we are simply returning to "indirect upbringing". We try to settle social matters in such a way that this will have an important significance in the upbringing. We do not settle matters in such a way as to make it easier for the youth, but to come closer to the ideals of social humanism, the values that today are threatened by public practice. But the conflict of theory with practice is devastating to the minds of the young.

[Question] Can you give me an example of any such action on your part?

[Answer] When we fought for an increase in credits for young married couples we were concerned about restoring something called social justice.

[Question] You mentioned three problems pertaining to the Union. What is the third?

[Answer] It is the five program priorities of which I spoke earlier.

[Question] You are going to the youth with these problems now, when the difficult problems of daily life discourage one from making long-range plans, when certain workplaces may be shut down due to a shortage of raw materials, when there is job insecurity. Will that work?

[Answer] We are talking about the most important matters of both the present and the future. A large part of the youth are depressed, in a kind of daze, especially those outside the Union, those who are not members. Particularly in the working community. Through this discussion we want to lift them out of this depression and, on the other hand, to place these justifiable mental states into the perspective of the realities which caused them.

9295
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TEACHERS' ROLE IN SCHOOL STRIKES CLARIFIED

Warsaw GLOS NAUCZYCIELSKI in Polish 21 Feb 82 p 5

[Article by Zbigniew Pawlowski: "Who Participated in the Strikes?"]

[Text] Serious accusations about the strikes in schools are being made these days in statements and in publications against teachers. Thus, society is led to believe that Polish educators--one and all-took part in strikes or were in favor of carrying out reform in education and in the school system by means of strikes, and by getting children and youth involved. In the meantime, opinions formulated in this way, which lump all teachers together, are simply erroneous. The truth is completely different.

Teachers--united in the Polish Teachers' Union[ZNP], and it is to this organization that over 70 percent of the active teachers belonged and nearly 100 percent of teachers on annuity or pension, were against school strikes, against any and all attempts to involve children and youth in adult matters and against various kinds of manifestations on school premises.

Admittedly, it was entered in the ZNP Statute that "ZNP employs all legally permissible means of implementing its goals including the right to strike"--however, in the post-August practice of its activities, the organization never took advantage of this entry. On the contrary, the Union declared itself decidedly against school strikes in many decisions and resolutions passed during the stormy period of 1980-1981.

Here are a few examples from recent months. In the declaration of the Secretariat of the Main Board of ZNP-Education, published in, among others, the GLOS NAUCZYCIELSKI of 4 December 1981, we read: "The pronouncement of readiness to strike in schools and educational institutions and the announcement of an active strike meets with our decided disapproval..." Strikes organized by extremist teachers within "Solidarity" in Lublin schools and in the voivodship of Lublin were met with an emphatic protest from teachers--ZNP members. In the appeal of the ZNP District Board and Department Board in Lublin, which was also published, among others, in GLOS NAUCZYCIELSKI,

stated: "We are categorically cutting ourselves off from strike activity which pushes the object of our work into the background; and which creates a state of emergency atmosphere, one of conflict, unrest and chaos...". Further on in this same appeal: "Dear Colleagues! We turn to you with an appeal: in the spirit of union discipline try to do everything possible so that order will reign in your educational institutions; so that exerted instructional efforts may continue; so that problems in education may be solved as effectively as possible for the good of the child and youth".

A unanimous stand on matters regarding student strikes in colleges and universities was also taken by the Main Board of ZNP-Science. In a proclamation published in issue 47 of GLOS NAUCZYCIELSKI from 22 November 1981 we read: "ZNP-Science steadfastly maintains the position that in the present situation, the escalation of strike activity impedes the generally awaited national accord. For this reason, we feel that neither the conflict in WSI Higher School of Engineering -Radom nor even the, by no means, justified delay in relegating the law on higher schools to the Sejm of PRL, constitute sufficient reason for general strike action in Polish academies.

Let us also be frank: in this activity, advocates of the rank and file membership of "Solidarity" were to be found among teachers and higher school instructors. There is evidence of this in the form of resolutions and proposals as well as many statements.

Thus, the stand taken by teachers in regard to school strikes and various kinds of political manifestations with the participation of children and youth was not--as some would think--unanimous. A decided majority of teachers and educators were against strikes. Such is the truth and all journalists who make public statements on this issue as well as the entire community should know about it.

In writing the above, we also wish to say that at present we do not want to divide teachers into those who were on strike in the voivodship of Lublin and those who did not succumb to the pressure of agitators and carried on normal lessons to the satisfaction of parents and youth. These are serious and complicated problems with which, above all, the teachers' community itself will have to contend in each particular school, bearing one thing in mind above all others: that schools in Poland was, is and will be a socialist school which prepares youth for the role of builders of People's Poland. This obvious truth is understood by teachers--by a decided majority of them. These teachers are also aware that our school, our education and national education in its entirety require reforms. These reforms must be introduced into practice as soon as possible; they concern a wide spectrum of problems--beginning with democratization of school life and ending with changes in program content. These reforms must be introduced if we want to raise our educational standards. This is talked and written about extensively.

Teachers united in ZNP-Education were in favor of these changes. However, they want to put them into effect in a way in which the importance of education and upbringing in the country requires it--after judicious discussion of the problems, whereby the word, judicious, has nothing in common with prolonging the solving of these problems indefinitely. The matter of the Teacher's Charter may be given here as an example. Owing only to the tenacity of ZNP-Education members, their responsibility and prudence in conducting a discussion on the draft of a Charter with the wide-ranging participation of teachers' groups as well as that of other social communities, we now have a law which was truly long awaited by the teachers' community.

In his article published in TRYBUNA LUDU entitled, "What Ought To Be Cast Aside--What Ought To Be Preserved", Piotr Rzadca writes, among other things: "A process is beginning of self-cleansing of the teachers' community from the negative phenomena of the pre-August past as well as from trends, which originated in recent months and which led to the negation of the entire output of education after the war. I write--self-cleansing--for I believe that this must be done by, above all, the teachers' community itself, which--I should think--knows best what will be beneficial for the school and what will bring it harm. It has sufficiently numerous social and political powers to accomplish this sensibly, fairly and objectively--for internal interpretation and not for subsequent disruption".

This is a just outlook. We make our columns accessible for such reflections as well.

9853
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PARTY MEMBERS PENALIZED FOR DISHONESTY, VIOLATION OF RULES

Bucharest MUNCA DE PARTID in Romanian Jan 82 pp 90-92

[Article]

[Text] A Bizarre Decision

Being accepted into the party is an act of great responsibility. No one is permitted to reduce the exigencies that are involved or to violate the instructions that regulate the activities in this field. Unfortunately, there still are situations where the requirements stressed above are not kept in mind. In the town of Brosteni in Suceava County, for example, the secretary of the town party committee, Vasile Sasu, and the secretary of the bureau of the base organization at the Brosteni Industrial High School, Elena Lese, serious violated the principles and norms referring to accepting people into the party.

The facts speak for themselves. On 9 October 1981, professor Gheorghe Pancu submitted a request to the bureau of the base organization to be accepted into the party. The next day the bureau drew up a report proposing that his request be accepted, and, after 6 days, the general assembly gave its approval with a tiny majority of votes, althought there were voices that expressed their bewilderment regarding the fact that they were aware of the bureau's intentions only in the general assembly and the speed with which the bureau moved, in the end taking a decision that, as we will see, was completely outside statutory bounds.

First of all, one of the recommendations, from the Union of Communist Youth organization, was the result of the foul play by the person who had requested acceptance into the party. As the deputy secretary of the committee of the town organi[illegible] of the Union of Communist Youth and as one who knew well how these [illegible]ations were given out, he avoided the accepted path and presented a fal[illegible]ocument drawn up by the secretary of the youth organization in the high schoo[illegible]. Neither the secretary of the base organization at the high school nor another member of the bureau deigned to check the recommendation, not to mention the fact that the secretary or, if she could not attend, another member of the bureau should have been present at such an assembly.

Second, in an absolutely unacceptable fashion the secretary of the town party committee asked the applicant who made the request to go to the place of his birth to get a... recommendation. Which he did!

Third, although some party members in the general assembly expressed reserve with regards to the manner in which the applicant had been trained and, as a result, four of them abstained from the voting, instead of taking these signs into consideration the secretary of the town party committee committed an act that was totally out of the ordinary: he directed the secretary of the organization's bureau to individually call forth those persons who had abstained from the voting and to have them... make written statements regarding their attitude.

What could have put a stop to these shortcomings? Clearly it could have been done; on the condition that the maximum spirit of responsibility had been operating in the bureau of the town party committee and in the county party committee instructor, comrade Filaret Cora, who had the job of keeping track to the best extent possible of the manner of accepting this professor into the party. This was not done, however, and in the session of the bureau, with the instructor present, those present confirmed with their eyes closed the decision of the general assembly. Nor did they find out about the true reason for all the machinations of the secretary of the town party committee and the secretary of the base organization bureau: on 9 October 1981, the date the request to be accepted into the party was forwarded, a letter had been sent to the County School Inspectorate in which the applicant was proposed for the position of director, stating that he was a member of the party!

In other words, one lie after another, a continuing slide on the path of dishonesty, insincerity and abuse that could come to an end only in their discovery and the taking of certain measures. The decision to accept him into the party and its confirmation were annuled. It seems, however, at least bizarre regarding the manner in which the guilty parties were sanctioned by the secretariat of the county party committee. Elena Lese was removed from her position as secretary of the base organization bureau and sanctioned with a "vote of censure", while the instigator of these deeds, Vasile Sasu, the one who fully demonstrated characteristics completely incompatible with the qualities of a party activist and who knowingly sponsored the violation of current regulations, was merely sanctioned with a "vote of censure". He retained his position! In this case, the lack of firmness and exigency is clear, where a decision should have been made that would have clearly shown that those persons who proceed in this manner will find no tolerance, being treated in accordance with the seriousness of the deeds they commit.

Tolerance Regarding Serious Violations

The party has asked and is asking all its members to give permanent proof of high professional and political awareness and to firmly combat any attempts to acquire the fruits of others' work through abuse, dishonesty or cheating. He who ignores such requirements seriously tarnishes his moral profile and commits a deed incompatible with the qualities of a communist.

Such was the case with Cornel Stoica, the former secretary of the party committee at the Simeria Processing Section of the Hunedoara Steel Combine. Putting their trust in him, the members of the party organization elected him to the Simeria City Party Committee. Similarly, they trusted to him the great responsibility of being a vice president of the executive bureau of the city people's council. Holding these two positions required an irreproachable comportment. But, he violated the people's trust, committing reprovable acts that were especially serious. He stole a significant number of beehives from a work colleague, causing a loss estimated at over 15,000 lei. Similarly, profitting from the position he held in the people's council where he had to be involved in certain demolition work, he purchased the materials left over after the demolition and transported them home using the section's tractor-trailer.

These violations were discussed in the plenary sessions of the party committees to which he belonged and in the session of the city people's council. He was excluded from the party organs and removed from his position as vice president. Surprisingly, however, he was sanctioned by the plenary session of the city party committee with... "a vote of censure with a warning". What has to be done to be excluded from the party?

After a report by the editorial staff of this magazine, the bureau of the Hunedoara County Party Committee directed a reanalysis of the case. The person who stained his honesty and human nature was placed in discussion in the general assembly of the base organization to which he belonged, resulting in an unanimous decision to exclude him from the party.

When the High Investiture by the People Is Confused With the Imaginery Position of "Owner of the Position"

For years, Constantin David of the town of Birla in Arges County had committed abuse after abuse in all the positions that he had held as the director of the Agricultural Machinery Station, president of the agricultural production cooperative or chief engineer there. Thus, ten hectares of the most fertile land were given in an overall agreement to nine citizens from Olt County so as to be planted with melons - outside of the provisions of the production plan approved by the general assembly of the cooperatist members. In two cases, several transports left the cooperative loaded with clover and good quality hay, and he paid with straw (?). He worked 2.17 hectares of corn under an overall agreement in his group, but in establishing the amount of production he calculated that where his family had worked the harvest was 1,000 kilograms per hectare greater than his neighbors'. He used the cooperative's transport vehicles for his own personal use, without paying the appropriate charges. At the same time, his brothers, Ion and Dumitru David, were given approval to use personal lots that were 16 and 12 square decameters, respectively, larger than they had a right to use.

With an impulsive and haughty nature, Constantin David got even with those who dared to criticize the illegal acts he committed, with some of them being

sanctioned for imaginery crimes. In analyzing the acts of engineer Constantin David, the plenary session of the town party committee sanctioned him, requesting his removal from the leadership positions that he held.

What was there need, however, for more than 2 years until the time when correctness, honesty and an atmosphere appropriate to the proper conduct of work could be put right? If there had been proof of firmness in their interventions, both by the party organization in the cooperative and by the town party committee, the abuses committed by CD could have been stopped from the first moments. This was not done because there was a tolerance in the judgement of the deeds and because the critical spirit was lacking.

A maximum number of lessons must be learned from the case of engineer Constantin David, both by the party committee in the agricultural cooperative and by the party committee and people's council in Birla, whose activities must be closely followed and supported. Just as this case must be broadly presented to the party activists and discussed with all management and technical personnel in the county's agricultural units.

8724
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VIOLATIONS OF LAW BY OFFICIALS IN CALARASI DEPLORED

Bucharest MUNCA DE PARTID in Romanian Jan 82 pp 57-62

[Article by Maria Cozma, D. Horomnea and I. Vaduva: "The Education of Cadre in the Spirit of Honesty, Correctness and Intransigency Towards Shortcomings and Violations - A Requirement Imposed Acutely by Reality"]

[Text] The moral profile of the communist, the party activist and cadre is linked, certainly, to the manner in which he deals with reality and to his understanding and exact communication of the existing state of affairs. This is so because, depending upon this, the party organs and organizations can work concretely through the most adequate measures for the purpose of eliminating eventual shortcomings and of ensuring the proper flow of affairs.

A communist must be honest, sincere, principled and corrent, must not tolerate lies, falsehoods and hypocrisy and must fight against attempts to cause superior organs and work comrades to err and against avoidance of responsibilities and duties, as is says in the Code of the Principles and Working and Living Norms for Communists.

In referring to this important aspect of the behavior of party and state cadre, comrade Nicolae Ceausescu stressed at the RCP Central Committee Plenary Session of November 1981 that "unfortunately, we have more than a few cases where some party organs and organizations are not appropriately fulfilling their roles in the organization of leadership activities and where - and I am referring especially to some party and state cadre and activists - either because of misunderstandings or because of the distortion of certain states of affairs they present unrealistic data and reports, exaggerating achievements or diminishing them..."

The Exigency of a Facade

As is known from the press, such inadmissible practices were also found in Calarasi County. Beginning with these indications, we attempted to see what lessons were learned after the unrealistic reporting during the summer regarding the wheat harvest campaign and what the party organs did so that these phenomena would not be repeated. Here is what we could find in the investigations that were conducted and from the discussions carried out with some party and state activists in the county.

For good reason, to militate for the strengthening of responsibility, order and discipline and for the establishment of honesty and correctness is one of the cardinal tasks of the party organs and organizations. This is an elementary duty for which there should not have to specific guidelines and recommendations, but one naturally carried out from one's own impulses. There is no doubt that many of the party organs and organizations even proceed in that manner. A primary, graphic example is the Calarasi Enterprise for Construction Materials in Calarasi Municipality. It is significant that here, right from the first signs of such negative phenomena, a firm attitude was taken, without waiting for urging and directives from the higher party organs.

At a point in time, comrade Tudor Stoian, the secretary of the party committee in this enterprise, was telling us, the habit started in out enterprise of reporting the production of panels and prefabricated elements for housing not by the number of component pieces, but by overall quantities: so many cubic meters of prefabricated parts were produced which, usually, means the achievement and even overfulfillment of the production plan. But, the complaints coming from the consumers that they were not receiving from our enterpise anything but wall panels and not all the other prefabricated items in the order required by the assembly process caused us to understand that actually things were not the way they should have been. In order to stop this trend of unrealistic reporting generated by the desire for large incomes - since there was talk of large incomes, we asked the bureau of the base organization of the prefabricated parts section to discuss the foreman, Constantin Macinic, who was protecting this system, and he was sanctioned with a "reprimand". The chiefs of the other sections were also called to task for not admitting to such practices. On the other hand, I proposed, in my position as president of the workers' council, and the council decided to no longer pay for the labor of those persons who do not adhere to the production of prefabricated items in the order called for by the assembly process.

It is curious, however, that precisely where there were a greater number of and more serious cases of distortions of realities, the party organs in the county did not promptly intervene to stop them, but on the contrary we encountered here and there a concessional situation and a total indifference towards party members involved in phenomena of this type.

At the former Plevna Agricultural Machinery Station in the town of Lupsanu in the spring of 1981, it was stated that 170 tractors were repaired and ready to go out into the fields. In fact, not even half of them were ready to be operated. The director of the unit, Catalin Mati, who was to be found guilty of this false report, was removed from his job and sanctioned with a "vote of censure with a warning" by the county party organ. The party organization, however, did not think it fitting to make a case out of this situation, in which there was not merely a single guilty party. It is true that in his position as director Catalin Mati had the duty to provide exact information about the real status of the tractors, but also at fault were those who did not repair

the equipment. And, precisely within the ranks of these workers there should have been - using this particular case - a powerful educational effort involving the strengthening of the spirit of responsibility, honesty and correctness.

When asked why there was no broad discussion of the events that occurred, Traian Gheorghe, the secretary of the base organization, told us clearly that from the moment that the punishment was handed out at such a level the base organization had nothing else it could do. This is the source of the misunderstanding of the natural duty of any party organization to undertake educational actions that will lead to the formation of opinions in communists and other workers in the spirit of intransigence towards shortcomings and a high exigency towards their own activities.

From what was uncovered at the county party committee, especially from the information provided by the first secretary, comrade Vasile Martin, we noted that the director of the Intercooperatist Economic Association in the town of Lupsanu, Vasile Oprisan, was removed from his post and sanctioned with a "vote of censure" for false reports regarding the increases in the weight of animals being fattened, disorder and an excessive mortality rate. This same was also shown in the report from the session of the county party committee secretariat of 15 November 1981, while the local newspaper VREMURI NOI [New Times] reported in its 17 November 1981 issue to the people in the county that "the serious violations uncovered and the existing shortcomings in zootechny caused the county party committee secretariat to decide to remove from office the director of the General Directorate of Agriculture responsible for activities in raising animals, Dr Constantin Pucheanu, and directors at the A.E.I. Calarasi and Lupsanu (Konza Wilhelm and Vasile Oprisan), as well as sending the last two to trial." A big surprise! At the Lupsanu Intercooperatist Economic Association we find one and the same person in the position of director, the person removed from office and slated for trial, Vasile Oprisan. This person seems undisturbed by anyone or anything in daily affairs.

With regards to the party organization at the pig raising complex, it did not direct its "attention" towards such affairs that led to the serious shortcomings that existed there - the delivery in 1981 of less than 900 tons of meat and the registering of losses of 13 million lei caused by exceeding by five times over the needed slaughter rate and the doubling of the permitted mortality rate.

Among the first persons called upon to fight to pull this unit out of its precarious situation was the party organizer and president of the Lehliu Unified Agro-Industrial Council, comrade Gheorghe Ivan. Ivan, however, as one of the people sanctioned by the party and drawing the necessary lessions, made the decision, we believe, in time in order to be rehabilitated through work. In the secretariat session that analyzed his lack of concern, comrade Gheorghe Ivan did not try to defend himself, like the chief engineer of the Plevna Unified Agro-Industrial Council who was also sanctioned with a "vote of censure with a warning" because he reported the clearing of certain fields and their seeding, which constituted a case of crass disinformation, and did not openly

recognize his error. Now, he tells us, happily, that he recognizes his error through the results obtained in 1981: an average per hectare production of 4,470 kilograms of corn; going into the new year with all plowing completed compared to 1980, when he had come into January with a shortfall of over 11,000 hectares or over three-fourths of what had to be completed left undone.

Direct Help, Not Tardy Intervention and Half-Way Measures

On the way to the town of Vasilati, comrade Gheorghe Dragomir, the president of the county party collegium, listed part of the deviations in the behavior of the mayor, Alexandru Androne. Among other things, he was nearly always drunk, including in all types of meetings in which he participated or chaired. This caused him to lose control of affairs in the town and, at the same time, to slide into promiscuity, into the basement of an immoral life. We find that this state of affairs was known for a long period of time in the county party committee and, with our being surprised that such a person would still be at the helm of the town, we interestingly awaited a discussion with him. At the mayor's office, however, we found only an office worker. According to this worker, comrade Alexandru Androne had gone to the Galbinasi Agricultural Production Cooperative. We wanted to have a discussion with the deputy secretary for propaganda affairs, comrade Niculina Mihalache, but she was also out of the office. By 1600 hours, she still had not come back into town, a situation far from being unique and one tolerated by the mayor in exchange for keeping quiet about his own violations. Being a commuter, the deputy secretary carried out her attributes between the arrival and departure of two of the most comfortable commuter trains and, from time to time, she took a day off, but not from her legal number of days of leave, but from a reduction in correctness.

Looking further for the mayor, we could not find him at the Galbinasi Agricultural Production Cooperative, because he had not been there. He has been taken however, back home in a clearly drunken state. He had been "toasting" with some workers who were working on enlarging his house. "Do you have a permit to expand the house," we ask him. He answers that he is the mayor and that, from what he knows, the mayor does not have to ask himself for permission. In other words, he does not have one. Nor did Ion Constantin, the chief of the militia post, when he built his garage with materials purchased not on the basis of agricultural products, as it is for everyone else, but for money. On the other hand, permits are required for anyone else in the town, if they are not relatives or friends of the mayor...

The discussion with this person continues under an avalanche of justifications for his deeds that are far from any laws and human nature. Here are some of them: allowing teaching faculty at the school in the village of Popesti to be late or absent, with the students frequently being left in the care of the cleaning crew; giving permission to a friend in the village of Lamotesti to organize a 3-day wedding in the school courtyard, with the bar being located within the school and causing classes to be cancelled for 3 days, in the presence of the mayor, who was the best man; authorizing Ion Mehedintu, a store clerk, to purchase three containers of cooking oil and three sacks of sugar in his name. After the county found out about this, the mayor fired another store clerk in

the consumer cooperative, the one who had "honored" the order. Certainly, after such a strictly personal oversupply of goods, numerous citizens in the town were no longer able to acquire the appropriate levels of cooking oil and sugar.

These are merely several of the practices of the mayor of Vasilati, as well as some of his friends who were encouraged to follow his example. This situation went on for a long period of time. As one of the local people stated, the town seemed to be his estate where arbitrariness and the law of pleasures dominated social relations and the relationship between the mayor's office and the masses. Although, as we have said, these practices did not occur over the course of weeks or months, but rather years, measures were not taken at the level of the former Ilfov County to stop them. Soon, it will be 1 year since the creation of Calarasi County and the leadership of this county still has not done anything, except to conduct a summary check of certain reports and to formulate... some intentions to remove the mayor. Thus, just the intention to remove him and that is all, without going any further to improve the basic situation by going right to the scene and giving the appropriate support and guidance.

Abuses, violations of the laws and violations of party directives also have been committed and are being committed frequently by Mihai Cihanovschi, the mayor of the town of Nana. The disinterest that he shows in the leadership of political and economic affairs in this town has a flip-side: his personal interests. For him, illegally acquiring the most diverse goods constitutes nothing more than a "right" stemming from his position. Other rights are considered to be long banquets in official rooms, requiring town officials to attend a wedding in Vaslui County where he married a couple in a religious ceremony, driving a motorcycle while under the influence of alcohol, endangering the lives of pedestrians, threatening and even beating citizens who do not do as he wishes, and nighttime searches conducted without warrants, in the company of sergeant major Nicolae Martac who, as far as he is concerned, should know the limits of carrying out a mayor's orders. In such a list of violations of laws and human dignity, it is not surprising that the activities of the party organ "headed" by Mihai Cihanovschi are also lacking content and efficiency. During the period of April to October 1981, there were no meetings of the bureau of the town party committee, with these meetings being replaced by the issuing of tasks. Finally, when these meetings were held, the reports were written several weeks later on the basis of notes and... recollections from memory. The review and direct guidance on the fulfillment of decisions and tasks were purely and simply abandoned after a short period of time of carrying them out.

The defective work style of the secretary of the town party committee also was reflected in the activities of the bureaus of the five base organizations. The work plans only to a small degree involved the real problems confronting these organizations - the achievementof tasks in an exemplary manner, the appropriate education of communists - deficiencies that gave the overall work a large dose of apathy.

The situation caused some residents of the town to notify the party leadership and, after the reports were checked, the secretariat of the county party committee found it fitting to sanction the mayor with "a vote of censure". The case was not put into discussion with the communists in the town nor did it constitute the subject of severe criticism in the instruction sessions organized at the county level in order to prevent other such situations. Actually, the seriousness of the violations does not justify the mild measure taken by the secretariat of the county committee, which, after this measure, no longer took an interest in Mihai Cihanovschi, losing sight of him once again and giving him the opportunity to continue his abusive practices and to lead the review organs to err once again. As a result, the reports concerning the mayor of the town of Nana have increased. It was, therefore, natural for the higher party organs to consider the sanction imposed by the county committee secretariat as insufficient, as it actually did, recommending further investigations for the purpose of applying certain adequate measures. This recommendation, however, has not produced anything to date, remaining in the status of a "future concern" of the bureau of the county party committee while the mayor and his friends, protected by the indulgence of the county organ, continue their slide through and around the most basic norms of ethics and equity.

Unfortunately, the bureau and the secretariat of the county party committee have not been involved in completely resolving other cases either. Thus, after the removal of the mayor of the town of Lucia for deeds that were similar to the ones mentioned above, in addition to gross disinformation regarding cadre affairs, the county party organ decided that the attributes of the secretary of the town party committee would be assumed by professor Veronica Stoian, the deputy secretary for organizational affairs. In reality, the town had no mayor since professor Veronica Stoian could not abandon her teaching responsibilities. In such a situation, the county party committee should have accelerated resolving this problem and supported political-organizational activities through the member of the county party committee bureau responsible for this region. It did not, however, happen that way. The bureau member rarely goes to the region while his direct support is usually the forwarding of tasks.

These same practices, furthermore, are also found in other towns to which we have referred.

The Cause of the Causes - A Defective Work Style

The existing state of affairs that we have presented is also explained by the fact that, according to what we could find, not even at the county party organ level have all the lessons been learned from what happened during the summer and firm measures have not been taken that will eliminate, right from the very beginning, any trends towards disinformation, a rosy presentation of the picture and a casual committment without discrimination and with a level of enthusiasm insufficiently based upon real possibilities in the fulfillmsnt of one task or another. Thus, after the higher party leadership pointed out the untruthful

content of the telegram in which the Calarasi County Party Committee anounced the conclusion of the wheat harvest and punished those who were guilty, it would have been natural for the bureau of the county party committee to have directed the carrying out of certain thorough, intransigent analyses at the level of each economic, industrial or agricultural unit, in construction, transportation, trade and so forth, and in each party organ and organization in order to uncover and sanction in an exemplary manner similar phenomena, preventing any tendency of this type. Things did not happen, however, in this manner. The general recommendation to "call those to task who were involved in what happened" led to the measure being applied only in some units and in some party organizations. This did not create the atmosphere necessary to stop any expressions of this nature or acts of dishonesty or impropriety and to guarantee that deeds like those pointed out will not be repeated. Our findings, unfortunately, even point out that in Calarasi County there still are serious deficiencies and that the work style practiced by some party organs and, as we have seen, even the county committee is seriously marked by formalism and a lack of efficiency.

Serious shortcomings and deficiencies are also noted with regards to educational work, lacking the prompt, formative and transforming intervention in the educational process. It could not be said that in Calarasi County there is no punishment for those who commit certain violations, those who do not carry out their jobs at their place of work. Certainly, those who do not carry out their tasks and do not show concern for the goods entrusted to them to be administered must be held responsible with all severity. But, it is equally necessary for the party organs to combine exigency with a permanent educational effort and to turn each case into a powerful educational experience, one that is preventative for the rest of the collective. And, of the numerous administrative sanctions only a small number where followed by party sanctions and even fewer of these were the subject of serious discussions and analyses in party general assemblies and work groups.

In this regard, a graphic example to us was the session of the bureau of the Oltenita City Party Committee on 15 December 1981, which had on its agenda two extremely important problems for party work in general and the theme of our report here: "The Concern of the Party Organs for the Growth and Education of Cadre" and "The Organization and Carrying Out of Political-Ideological Education". Being held a short period of time after drastic measures were taken to remove certain cadre from their positions for serious violations of the norms of our socialist behavior and work abuses, involving the former first secretary of the city party committee, the president of the city council of trade unions and five directors and deputy directors from different economic and commercial units in the city, you would expect that this session would have carried out a serious analysis that would have shown clearly what had to be done by the city committee and the other party organs so that such violations would not be repeated, as well as to thoroughly understand those who were promoted and to provide for their careful support and education. But, both the materials presented and those who spoke were satisfied to present merely some figures and data regarding the problem in general, leaving people to think that everything is going so well that people would ask why it was necessary for the bureau to discuss these aspects.

Correctly, the first secretary of the county party committee, who was present at this session, made an appeal, both through certain interventions during the course of the session and in his final speech, for the need to discuss these important aspects of party work that are closely tied to the specific problems confronting the party organs in the city of Oltenita and to the activities to fulfill economic tasks. However, instead of leading the bureau of the city party committee to an exacting self-criticism and to identifying those aspects that still need its prompt, qualified intervention in the problem of forming and educating cadre and raising their level of political-ideological training, the first secretary restricted himself to pointing out the good results obtained by certain economic units since the time the county was created, creating an atmosphere of self-satisfaction and pomp. Under these conditions, it is no wonder that this session decided nothing.

Finding that there were some gaps in the application of the new economic-financial mechanism and in the completing and reporting of certain erroneous economic reports at the county level, it is commendable that they initiated some courses and series of speechs with the party personnel in the economic field - presidents, first vice presidents and vice presidents of the workers' councils, chief accountants, planning office chiefs and so forth. Commendable measures were also taken along the lines of training the secretaries of the party committees and the bureaus of the base organizations and the members of these bodies in the direction of understanding and applying in a unified manner the instructions of the RCP Central Committee and the party decisions, drawing up summary materials containing all the methodologies of party work and the attributes of each component of the party organs, which, when made available to them and presented within the framework of instruction, constitute a guide of great utility for their practical activities.

Unfortunately, the same concern is not expressed for the education of cadre and for their formation as the active, revolutionary militants of the party who will know how to place the interests of the people above all else, how not to tarnish the title of communist under any circumstances and how not to violate the trust of the party and the masses. Several educational-formative actions were outlined in the program of monthly instruction for the party apparatus. Althought few in number, in recent months they have hot been achieved either because for a number of reasons the time alloted to them was reduced to 1 or 2 days instead of the 4-5 days that were scheduled or because of the fact that they were not held at all.

The phenomena that we have encountered attest that there are serious gaps in the work style of many party organs and organizations in Calarasi County and in the control that it exercises in all areas of economic, social and political affairs.

Certainly, the county is a new one and the leadership team is still being formed. But, the serious violations that have been pointed out, as well as the half-way measures that are used to deal with these violations, and the

visible deficiencies in the educational work that the county party organ is called upon to carry out with greater perseverance and skill require an urgent mobilization of forces and the possibilities that the county party committee actually has in order to thoroughly base its activities on the enduring support of the principles and norms of party work.

8724
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REVISIONS DEMANDED IN DRAFTS OF LCY CONGRESS DOCUMENTS

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian No 1624, 14 Feb 82 pp 10-12

[Article by Stevan Niksic]

[Text] Numerous remarks about the draft congress resolutions indicate that the texts are too general, too broad, full of phrases and long-established truths, but poor in answers that are justifiably expected from such documents. These attitudes bear witness that the preparations for the 12th LCY Congress differ in some ways from the usual documents offered at such times.

At the end of last week we learned that the Commission for Preparing the Draft Resolution of the 12th LCY Congress, which is to be held in several months, has returned the proffered draft documents, entitled "The Role and Tasks of the LCY in the Struggle for the Development of Socialist Self-Management and for the Material and Social Progress of the Country." The commission called for fundamental corrections. From that apparently common information, we can perceive in many ways the specific character of current preparations for the coming party congress of Yugoslav communists. When we keep in mind that the pages of party and other newspapers have already begun to carry public debate on the content of the coming congress resolutions and on the themes that should be found in these documents, it is not hard to reach a conclusion about the significant differences in comparison with what has been usual before party congresses until now.

At the same time, we can already discern the basic contours of the coming 12th LCY Congress, considering that the preparations, including work on proposed congress resolutions, have entered the final phase.

In the past months there have been many, perhaps even futile or overly academic debates on the subject of whether this will be a congress of changes, of a turning point, or a congress of continuity. It could also be a congress of sterility, according to a recent comment, in jest, by a well-known scholar who was expressing his dissatisfaction with the quality of the preliminary draft of congress documents, which have now appeared.

For many, chiefly well-known and justifiable reasons, preparations for the 12th LCY Congress began rather late. Judging from the first texts, which will serve as the basis for debate at the congress, and the public reactions to those texts, they were not as well done fundamentally as, let's say, was the

case before the 10th or 11th LCY congresses. It is enough to recall the preparations for the last, 11th Congress: A year and a half before that congress, Edvard Kardelj, at the behest of the LCY Central Committee Presidium, prepared the projected congress platform. From that work later came the book "Directions of Development of the Socialist Self-Management Political System." That text was published in tens of thousands of copies and, in the course of debate lasting several months, not only the party membership but the entire Yugoslav public had the opportunity to express its opinions about the proposals.

It seems that this time, some hot political themes of recent months and the elections this spring have attracted much more attention and somewhat overshadowed this broad and important work and pushed it into second place. That is borne out among other things by a whole series of information about preparations for the republic and federal congresses published recently, which openly and sharply criticize the proposed texts of the congress documents. The most frequent comments are that they are general, overly broad and empty, crammed with phrases and long-established truths, but poor in answers that might reasonably be expected from such documents. A few days ago the Commission for Preparing the Political Report on the Work of the Macedonian LCY Central Committee reached a similar conclusion; the corresponding commission of the Serbian LCY Central Committee stated in its draft report, which should be presented at the congress, that certain evaluations in the draft were "idealized" and then there is a lack of high critical perceptions and arguments."

Superfluous Words

With the simple and picturesque remark that the text contains "many heaps of superfluous words," Stipe Suvar gave probably the most precise evaluation of the proposed basic congress document. He was speaking last week at a session of the Commission for Preparing the Draft Resolution of the 12th LCY Congress. "The entire commission will have to do a lot of work yet. If it stays as it is, this resolution will be far below the level of the program documents for the two previous congresses. Superfluous words and proclamations disturb everyone because they are contrived and they annoy all of us. We have annoyed ourselves by repeating the same cliches year after year." Suvar came out for a "congress of continuity," but he stressed that that formulation should not conceal the powerful weakness of characterizing at the same time a congress of theoretical and practical political stagnation and "declarative confessions and oaths as a form of unique expressions of a feeling of impotency of the League of Communists both in the LCY and in society."

Otherwise, there was an interesting debate at that session that was more concerned with things not covered by the proposed congress resolution text than with what was on its 100-plus pages. In starting the discussion of economic problems in the proposed resolution, Mito Hadzivasilev noted that the authors of the proposed text had largely avoided mentioning certain disputed matters, and that precisely for that reason many gaps are to be found in this voluminous text. He suggested that a statement be entered into the resolutions that would indicate that one of the most important causes of the present economic difficulties was in the "unsatisfactory recognition of the economic principles of socialist production of goods." In his opinion, that makes possible manifestations of voluntarism and subjectivism in the behavior

of self-management subjects, uncontrolled trends in social reproduction, extravagant spending, egoistic behavior, and administrative measures.

Most participants in the later discussion agreed that it is significant and important to point out the need for respecting "economic principles" in society, but nevertheless they did not accept Hadzivasilev's suggestion that that should be given special study in the way he proposed.

Milan Kucan, however, warned that a condition for continuity in LCY policy, which all support, is the elimination of the major weaknesses that lead us into serious difficulties and compromise our system of socialist self-management. The chief cause of these weaknesses is in economic policy, as it has been and continues to be conducted at these levels. In Kucan's view, we must make a radical break with that sort of economic policy. He said: "I think that current circumstances, especially those provoked by the economic trends and the status in our material relationships, generate many questions, confusion and lack of control in the LCY and in society as a whole. That brings with it a series of problems of an ideological and political nature and influences ideological and political disunity, and at times, ineffectiveness in the LCY as a whole. The most important problem is that in this period we have built an autarchic program and a concept for developing the country that needs to be changed fundamentally. That autarchic Yugoslav and autarchic republic, and even opstina manner of development has provoked the operation of noneconomic elements, for only in that way could it justify its autarchic character. We must get started changing it tomorrow." These words came from Ante Markovic.

How To Mend The Trough

Kiro Gligorov, as well as most other participants in this discussion, came out in favor of having future congress documents contain a valid program of economic stabilization. However, he also warned that there are quite a few misunderstandings in that along with the disagreements. Gligorov said: "In the last 10 years or so we have had two or three stabilization programs, and all of them aimed at patching something, at putting the water that had run out of the trough back into it."

Gligorov gave similar evaluations as early as the beginning of December, when he gave the keynote presentation at a session of the Commission for Preparing the Resolution of the 12th LCY Congress. The newspaper KOMUNIST carried it under the typical title "When and in What Did We Err." At that time Gligorov stated: "There are no theoretical or empirical proofs that we erred in the basic elements of the self-management system." He went on to specify that as basic elements he meant the stipulations in the constitution and the Law on Associated Labor. However, at that time he also expressed the opinion that many other so-called "systemic laws" cannot be raised to the same "rank." He referred to laws on planning, prices, the monetary and credit system, the banks and the foreign-exchange system. Gligorov suggested that it was possible to adapt and change these laws: "A strict position in connection with these laws would shackle or pacify active social factors so that they could not affect the timely overcoming of certain weaknesses as they emerged. In the opposite case, we simply tie our own hands, and dogmatize social thought."

Miladin Korac, a member of the LCY Central Committee and professor of the Belgrade School of Economics, reacted by opposing some of the positions taken by Gligorov.

In an article published 2 weeks later in the same paper, Korac presented the opinion that "not only among economists, but among politicians as well, there are many disagreements and, very often, conscious deception" about the role and significance of agreementmaking and contracting, the market and economic principles. Therefore, Korac concluded: "In the resolution of the 12th Congress, it is not necessary again to clarify or clean up all those problems and relationships. Rather, if possible we should more precisely determine what actions should be undertaken in order for this and other clear LCY definitions to be implemented in practice."

In this debate, as in some other theoretical and political debates by economists (see, for example, the discussion "Why the Economists Are Silent" in the latest issues of NIN), the center of interest is the role of the market in a self-management socialist society, and concepts such as "economic principles," or "self-management agreementmaking and contracting." In the meantime, Belgrade economist Ivan Stojanovic entered the debate on the pages of KOMUNIST. He believes that Korac and the other economists who agree with him have not explained satisfactorily why here in Yugoslavia in the last decade the role of the market has been shackled, while the importance of state control has grown, with clearly damaging effects.

In the latest issue of KOMUNIST, Gligorov replied to Korac by expressing the opinion that there is no doubt that in practice between the 11th and 12th congresses of the LCY that has been a suppression of economic laws and the market in their objectively necessary functions. At the same time, Gligorov says, we have come into conflict with uncontrolled elements, with economic instability. Government regulation is growing in economic and social currents, while autarchy and the regionalization of the Yugoslav marketplace is ever more pronounced. Plans have been unrealistic, overly optimistic and with strong doses of voluntarism.

Clear and Unclear

Gligorov asserted that he agreed with Korac concerning his evaluation of the importance and urgency of self-management agreementmaking and social contracting in our system. In contrast to Korac, however, he said that he believes that negotiations and contracting will attain increasing significance if we straighten out the relationship toward the market and economic principles, and eliminate the subjective relationships toward this institution and its conscious idealization. Thus he comes out openly for "clarification" and "elimination."

This in many ways characteristic polemic illustrates in the best way the mood in the present phase of preparations of the congress resolutions. In the opinions of some, we need only make more precise determinations of how the clear decisions of the LCY can be implemented and brought to life conscientiously. According to others, it is necessary first of all to "clarify" and "eliminate," despite the fact that the basic determinations, as all confirm, are correct and indisputable.

The debate thus far on the proposed texts for the congress documents has also brought out some other ideas, as well as some new dilemmas and considerations. For example, at the session mentioned above it was suggested that in the congress resolution the LCY should come out categorically against "receiving rent for holding a job." Specifically, several discussants cited the well-known facts that show that in Yugoslavia today the average workday is but 3.5 hours, and that labor productivity here is from 2 to 2.5 times lower than in Western Europe. This is related to existing regulations and the practice of juridical agencies, which offer absolute protection of employment in such a way that, in some opinions, they tolerate malingering.

As one participant in this discussion stated: "The unemployed are also members of our society, and they have the right, not only to vacant jobs, but also to jobs that are being held but are not being performed in harmony with the nature of social ownership of the means of production." In joining such opinions, Mijat Sukovic nevertheless warned that this is a rather "delicate question." He started from the fact that it is necessary to solidify even further the social security of the worker in his job, but we should "shake the legally solid security of the nonworker in his job." He did not say how that could be done, although he perceives that it is not simple.

Only a day later in Belgrade there was a meeting of the Council for Preparing the Eighth Congress of the Serbian LCY, which considered draft resolutions on the political system, science, culture, education and the media. Once more it was asserted that the texts were too broad, that the chief evaluations in them should be formulated more clearly. Among many proposals, suggestions were made that the resolution should contain chapters about the freedoms, rights and responsibilities of each person and citizen and on the freedom of creativity in scholarship. It was also asserted that the conclusions of the Serbian LCY Central Committee on the continued development of unity and community in Serbia provide an opportunity to make a step forward in the congress resolution regarding the content of the previous Congress's resolution.

It is difficult, even impossible to count all the topics that were mentioned so far in the discussions of the document for the coming congress. Although not much time remains before the congress, in the coming few months it would still be possible, and sufficient, to transform the most important elements in the draft into a projected congress decision and to offer it to the delegates for consideration.

12131
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KUMROVEC MEETING CENTERS ON FEDERAL, REGIONAL PROBLEM

Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 14 Feb 82 p 6

[Article by Seada Hodzic: "A Nonunited Approach To Unity"]

[Text] More than three hundred scientific workers and teachers of Marxism gathered at the speaker's platform in Kumrovec for the "Marxist Week discussions," in order to examine the development of internationality relations on the basis of socialist self-management from various aspects and to clarify it in terms of theory.

What did the discussion in Kumrovec show? Was it able to reflect the relationship of our theory to social events? Did it also show the limitations of our ranges of preception in dealing with the issues of nationality relations within Yugoslavia?

We could raise questions endlessly, but we still cannot seek complete answers at a conference like this, in spite of the fact that the organizers (the center for ideological and theoretical work of both the republican and provincial central committees) tried to make this meeting an open one and a critical exchange of views. There was, of course, a great deal of dialogue, critical confrontation of views, agreements and disagreements, and some good reports, but there were also some reports that are written for all occasions, as at many similar conferences.

One of the participants in the discussion said that it seemed to him that there is no high degree of unity in our theory and scientific thought, for example, when we discuss such a sensitive theme as the existence of a united Yugoslav market under the conditions of the existence of national economies. All of us, he said, agree on the need for a united market; it is just that some of us define it differently, and others even see different ways of attaining it.

We have to admit that even the participants in this year's "Marxist week discussions" gave grounds for such a claim. For example, Kiro Gligorov supported the free operation of economic laws in the market, naturally a united one. "Taking into account the economic laws of socialist commodity production," he said, "and the economic compulsion that they contain in

themselves, along with planning as a tool for the conscious regulation of socioeconomic trends, make it possible to administer social funds, income, and the surplus of labor responsibly and efficiently, for the benefit of the workers, the organizations of associated labor, and the entire society."

He was supported in these views by Dr. Vojo Rakic, who did not agree with the views of many of the participants in the discussion that associated labor has been restricted within republican and provincial limits. He furthermore cited various forms of cooperation, commodity trade, and collaboration.

In contrast to this, Dr. Stipe Suvar, who also supports a united market, asserted that such a market does not exist, but should be organized. He said that a completely free market does not exist anywhere. In the world it is divided up among 850 multinational companies. Allowing the market to function freely does not just mean the overnight failure of two or three thousand firms, but also a danger that the underdeveloped areas might lag even further behind in development.

A fairly stormy discussion, as well as some confusion, was generated by the question of the existence of republican and provincial economic relations. One participant asked whether this conflicted with the constitutional right of associated labor to cross republican boundaries and to seek its interests outside the territory of a republic, and to unite [with other organizations].

Vukasin Stambolic said, "I have an impression that many people recoil from national economies out of fear that this concept conceals aspirations for different (ethnic) socialisms in Yugoslavia."

"Some people already shiver when national economies are mentioned," Suvar says. "Yugoslavia really could not exist at all, except possibly in the sense of the European Economic Community, if real national economies were to exist here, because this would entail separate currencies, customs, and so forth. Our republics neither have this nor are able to have it. National economies should therefore be understood in a conventional sense. Under our conditions this means the right of each national group to dispose of its surplus labor, and the right of the republics and provinces to the labor surplus created within their territory. But under the circumstances of the Yugoslav division of labor that is established by the producers themselves. This would then make the regional economies open ones, and open Yugoslavia up to the world. One of the political conditions in building associated labor is the condition that we do not allow any de-Tito-ization and de-Kardeljization, which is being thrust upon us secretly with the aim of restoring the old order. Many forces are nibbling away secretly," he said.

A National Messiah

"But even within the framework of such a conventional national economy," one of the participants in the discussion said, "there are forces that take the surplus of labor away from the producers. Who is now making the decisions in the republics and provinces on behalf of the producers and on behalf of the people?", he asked.

Dr. Suvar answered that the organized producer still does not make decisions in a self-managing manner in the region and on behalf of the people. Various intermediary forces make the decisions. We can argue and conclude whether it is the bureaucracy or the technocracy; the intelligentsia--productive and creative--which most often plays the role of the ideological advocate of a people, springs up from this and multiplies itself. One of the problems of Kosovo is the pathological increase in the intelligentsia, which was not proportionate to the development of the working class and the productive forces. It played on the card of being the messiah of the nation, the "carrier" and "savior" of the [Albanian] nation, ideologically antagonizing the Albanian population against all others and pathologically proclaiming the idea of a "pure Kosovo," because then the intelligentsia would be the cultural and social master in everything.

The discussion in Kumrovec also stimulated many other questions. Many dilemmas were opened up and many individuals were even disturbed by Vukasin Stambolic's discussion on Yugoslavism being a national orientation (he was actually conducting a polemic with the positions from the interview with Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo by the journalist Vuk Draskovic), which some of the participants of the Kumrovec roundtable perceived as an denunciation of all those declaring themselves to be Yugoslavs. In fact, the establishment of a link between Yugoslavism and the doctrine of the so-called socialist nation gave rise to several sharp reactions from the participants in the conference even thought this was expressed through criticism of the positions in the above-mentioned interview, and the interpretation of such a statement of nationality as a political symptom of some sort of future demand for such citizens to be organized as a separate political entity.

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VUKMANOVIC-TEMPO DISPUTES BAKARIC ON PARTY HISTORY

Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croation 15 Feb 82 p 9

[Article by Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo: "What Did the Comintern Really Want?"]

[Text] The New Year VJESNIK published an interview with Comrade Bakaric in which he referred to my speech at the Petar Kocic Library.

The part of the interview that applies to me reads as follows: "Tempo said in ILUSTROVANA POLITIKA that I was keeping silent. This was after a beautiful introduction saying that people are suppressing history, and then he said in regard to me that I was keeping silent, and then he continued by saying that no one has written the truth about 1941 in Zagreb. In the first place, I have said publicly everything that I had to say about 1941 and everything that I know. I do not know why Tempo is not aware of this. Secondly, I do not know how he can know that no one is telling the truth, because many people have written about this topic, and he was not here himself, but in Bosnia, as he says, and I do not know how he can know that no one is telling the complete truth, except unless he wanted to amuse the audience."

I must say that such a statement surprised me, because Bakaric had to be aware from my letter published in ILUSTROVANA POLITIKA that there were several errors and inaccuracies in the report by its journalist about the meeting at the Petar Kocic Library. He should have found out first from there what I really said at that meeting. Since he did not do this, I have to explain how the Kerestinec case came to be mentioned, in which context I also mentioned Bakaric's name.

The Background of the Kerestinec Case Has Not Yet Been Clarified

In speaking about the suppression of history by some of the participants of the revolution, as well as some historians, I cited the parts of the memoirs of Cola Dragojceva and the book by Vladimir Dedijer which dealt with me. I saw immediately that I had made a mistake. In fact, the people present began to bring up questions that I could not answer because I did not know the subject well enough. Thus, among other things, I was asked what I thought about what Dedijer had written regarding the Kerestinec case. The question was accompanied by surprise that something like that could have happened in our party and our revolution. I did not want to answer that question, not

because I was trying to avoid answering awkward questions (I have never done that), but, as I have already emphasized, because I did not know the subject well enough. I therefore said that I was in Bosnia at that time, and that I knew some features of the Kerestinec case, like other readers, from newspaper articles published in POLITIKA on the basis of Dedijer's book. Then someone spoke up from the audience and said to me that I was Vlado Popovic's best friend and that he had probably told me about that event, since he was on the scene. I stopped for a moment. Vlado Popovic really did tell me about that event, but I felt that it was not advisable to involve a dead man in the clarification of this event. But I nevertheless wanted to say that Dedijer's writings did not clear up the Kerestinec case, and especially not the background of it. That is why I said something similar to what is included in the newspaper report; namely that of the people who were on the scene and knew what happened, Vlado Popovic is dead and Vlado Bakaric is keeping silent. At that time I forgot to mention several other people as well: for example, that Rade Koncar is also dead and the Blagoje Neskovic is also keeping silent... I repeated that no one who has written about the Kerestinec case has told the complete truth, and that Dedijer does not do this in his book either.

What Vlado Popovic Told Me

I did not intend to state what Vlado Popovic told me during the 1950's about the Kerestinec case, but since I am now called upon to do so, I have to say the following: in some way at that time I stated in the press for the first time who had attended the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPY [Communist Party of Yugoslavia] on 4 July 1941; I also wrote that at that meeting it was decided that Zujovic, Djilas, and I would leave for Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Hercegovina in order to organize the armed struggle. We had extraordinary authority. Vlado Popovic criticized me for not writing that he went to Croatia with the same task. I answered that he had not attended the Politburo meeting and that I did not know how he had received such a task and such authority. He told me that on the following day he had visited Comrade Tito and that he was then given the same task with the same authority. At the same time he told me the kind of difficulties that he had encountered in Zagreb. Among other things, he told me about the background of the Kerestinec case. According to his story, a Comintern tactic, well known from the time of the factional struggles within our party, was then being repeated. People who were otherwise good Communists, in the leadership of the Communist party of Croatia, were being slandered for not following the Comintern line (in regard to the armed struggle), and some even for being agents of the class enemy. This, of course, was a well known operation, tested several times, and in all likelihood organized by the Comintern, in order to replece the leadership at that time, as was finally done. A Comintern dispatch replaced the slandered leadership, and in place of it a mandator (Kopinic) was named to constitute a new leadership. This mandator began to contact inficual Communists in order to form a new leadership. Popovic cited the names of several Communists who would have agreed to form part of that new leadership.

When Popovic learned about all of this, he immediately informed Comrade Tito in Belgrade, feeling that the entire action was directed not only against

the Croatian leadership but against Comrade Tito as well. Comrade Tito formed a commission to investigate the entire case. Blagoje Neskovic went from Belgrade to Zagreb. The commission determined what was going on and wrote a report for the Central Committee. It also proposed party punishments for several communists. The proposed punishments were for the most part adopted by the Central Committee. It is not important that some of the punishments were reduced. The important thing is that the punishments were imposed, not just because of the Kerestinec case, but also because of their conduct in attempting to overthrow the existing leadership and replace it with a new one, which would obviously have been in accordance with the will of the Comintern. But the main actor (Kopinic), who apparently did all of this at the order of the Comintern, could not be punished. He was directly responsible to the Comintern for his work. Thus the Central Committee of the CPY could not punish him, but it suggested to the Comintern that he also be punished; the Comintern, however, did not accept this proposal. Naturally, all of this is what I recall of what Vlado Popovic told me in the 1950's. Comparing this with the parts of Dedijer's book published in POLITIKA, as well as his statements that there are several documents that cannot be published because of the "historical distance," I concluded that the full truth had not yet been stated about the Kerestinec case. And when I read Bakaric's letter (or note) to Dedijer, in which he stated some minor and actually insignificant criticisms, I concluded that Bakaric was keeping silent. This is what I said when the participants in the talks at the Petar Kocic Library insisted that I answer the questions about the Kerestinec case. The newspaper reporter distorted this, but the substance remained unchanged.

The Policy and Intentions of the Comintern

It can be seen from what Bakaric is writing now and his reactions to what Dedijer wrote that he kept silent in regard to the background of the entire "case," in regard to what was to be achieved by replacing the leadership of the Communist Party of Croatia. When it is a question of whether the Comintern was conducting a policy of dividing Yugoslavia, I have to say that it is difficult to accept the position that Bakaric stated in VJESNIK. Furthermore, I do not feel that the attempt to replace the leadership of the Communist Party of Croatia was necessarily a result of the Comintern's intention to separate the Croation Communist Party from the rest of Yugoslavia and thus make it possible to divide up Yugoslavia, as Dedijer claims. I do not have any proof for something like this, but this was Vlado Popovic's view when he told me about the Kerestinec case. But even without this, such a conclusion is indicated by the dispatch from the Executive Committee of the Comintern, which was sent to our Party sometime (I think) around the end of March 1941; this document said that the CPY should not fight to defend the borders of Yugoslavia. This, in my opinion, cannot mean anything other than creating the conditions for a future division of Yugoslavia, naturally under more favorable circumstances. This is why it is necessary, instead of a facile rejection of Dedijer's thesis that this was an attempt to divide Yugoslavia (which had already been divided by the occupier), to initiate further investigation of the background of the attempt to replace the leadership of the Croation Communist Party, especially if one takes into account what happened somewhat earlier in Macedonia.

There is even less justification for saying that Satorov's attempt to separate the organization of the Macedonian Communists from the CPY and attach it to the Communist Party of Bulgaria was a purely internal affair of the Yugoslav Communists and that Comintern policy was not responsible for it. If this were so, Satorov's action would have been prevented quickly. In fact, the Macedonian Communists were willing to remain part of the CPY, but many circumstances indicate that this was a long-term and well thought out action. First of all, the Comintern sent Satorov to Macedonia to be appointed secretary of the LCY PK for Maceonia. This is what Comrade Tito told me when I was supposed to form the leadership of the Macedonian Communists in 1940. If Satorov's later action are taken into account, it can be concluded that he was sent with "ulterior" motives. In the second place, when Yugoslavia surrendered and the country was divided up by the occupiers, Satorov felt that favorable conditions had come about for separating the organization of the Communists in Macedonia from the LCY and attaching it to the Communist Party of Bulgaria. In doing this he called for a decision by the Comintern, and it was necessary to wait for months until the Comintern decision finally arrived (although there was regular and almost daily radio communication). In the third place, the Comintern decision was formulated in such a way that it left enough leeway to prevent the development of an armed struggle in Macedonia, in order to create more favorable conditions later on for Macedonia to be finally "annexed" to Bulgaria, thus dividing up Yugoslavia. This can easily be established if one studies the documents available from the time before, during, and after the war.

Erroneous Directives and Predictions

It is a somewhat more complex question whether the leadership in Serbia (Neskovic), following the withdrawal from western Serbia, conducted a Comintern policy in regard to the armed struggle against the occupiers. It is difficult to defend the arguments of Bakaric that the Comintern line was not that the struggle should be carried out in the cities and not in the hills, that Neskovic did not have any connection with the Comintern, that there are not any documents from which it could be seen that Neskovic was presenting the creation of new units, etc. On the contrary, all of these "arguments" should be subjected to thorough analysis. It is correct that at the beginning of the war (in 1941) the Comintern called for a struggle against the occupiers in the hills and the cities. Even Stalin, in his November speech, emphasized the struggle of the Yugoslav partisans. The Comintern directive, however, was that this was not a socialist revolution, but only a struggle against the occupiers. The Communist parties (except for ours and some others) understood this directive to mean that the socialist revolution was still to come and that it would be conducted in the cities, just as in the case of the October Revolution. Preference in the struggle against the occupiers was therefore still given to the struggle in the cities. This may explain the fact that none of the countries in which the Communists adopted this line developed a national armed uprising until just before the end of the war. After all, in his November speeches Stalin no longer praised the struggles of the Yugoslav partisans (although we had achieved many more successes), but rather stressed the strikes by workers in France. And in the Comintern circles, according to Vlahovic, it was said that our party was isolated in the hills and that the

armed uprising would be inevitably defeated. All of this throws a very clear light on the nature of the Comintern line.

It obviously follows from this that it was not necessary to have direct contact with the Comintern in order to be actually following its line. This is confirmed by the practice of many Communist parties that did not have direct contact with the Comintern but carried out its line and lost the chance, which is rarely offered, of achieving victory in a socialist revolution.

A separate question is what kind of line was followed in Serbia after the withdrawal of the supreme headquarters and the main body of our forces from western Serbia. [illegible] question has not yet been cleared up; there are no documents availa[illegible]hat could help to answer it. Conclusions can only be drawn indirectly, on the basis of certain facts. These facts are as follows: first, after the withdrawal about 2,000 soldiers returned to the area of western Serbia from Sandzak (they came to their own area and remained there until they were completely destroyed!). Secondly, at the same time over 2,000 soldiers were in the partisan units in the area of southeast Serbia and Sumadija; the occupier forces conducted an offensive against them and decimated them, but did not destroy them (these units held on for the entire war and by 1943 developed into brigades, and in the first half of 1944 into divisions). Thirdly, during all of this time, up until the middle of 1943, the leadership of the LCK PK for Serbia was located in the city (Belgrade). Military and political leaders (Mirko Tomic, Moma Markovic, and others) who were almost irreplaceable in the field were even withdrawn from the field (from the units), and were not able to contribute a great deal in the city in view of the fact that they were known to the police and could not move freely so that they were prevented from working in the city. In the fourth place, until the middle of 1943, almost no workers were sent from the cities to the existing partisan units, although the workers, and especially the youth in the cities were willing to join the partisans (there were also opportunities to accept and distribute these people among the existing partisan units, especially in southeast Serbia).

An Orientation That Cost Us a Great Deal

These are the facts, on the basis of which it is not difficult to conclude that the predominant orientation among the Serbian leadership was nevertheless to remain in the cities, i.e. that the center of the struggle was in the cities. If this assessment is correct, it has to be said that such an orientation cost our party a great deal. We lost the best Communists in raids in the cities (Mirko Tomic and others); all of the partisan units in western Serbia were crushed; the partisan units in southeast Serbia and Sumadija were decimated; and the development of the national liberation struggle in Serbia was considerably slowed. Such a state of affairs cannot be explained by the attitude of the population, because in 1941 it had entered the struggle against the occupiers on a mass scale, nor by the strength of the occupiers and their servants. It is thus a mistake to claim that the orientation of the Serbian leadership was not to remain in the cities.

Finally, I am extremely surprised by the way in which Bakaric is attempting to neutralize my speech at the Petar Kocic Library: first of all by how he can state, even as a hypothesis, that I was talking about these problems (the Kerestinec case) in order to "amuse the audience," and in the second place, by why he did not inquire about the kind of audience that attended the meeting before stating this hypothesis. Those present were the leading people in our revolution, historians, and other public figures, who would not have accepted anything that had been stated "in order to amuse the audience."

I also must refer to the article by Marinko Gruic, the president of the VJESNIK SOUR [complex organization of associated labor]. He actually says that certain economists have taken up some of my positions, and that these positions are unacceptable to the LCY. To tell the truth, he did not say which positions these were, and so it is impossible for me to answer him, although I feel that among Communists all issues should be discussed publicly and without allusions. This is all the more true because we are about to hold the LCY congresses, at which Communists, through their delegates, are to formulate the line that we all have to adhere to until the following congress. There are no issues that can be excluded from the pre-congress discussion--the LCY Central Committee does not have this right, and individuals in particular do not have it. If it were done otherwise, the line of the LCY would not be established by the Communists through their delegates to the congresses, but rather by the existing leadership, whose mandate is to expire with the convening of the congress. It is natural to expect that there will be a minority and a majority in this discussion. The minority has to be an equal partner in the discussion, until the Congress adopts the position of the majority, to which the minority must then yield. This is the essence of democratic centralism. We will not abide by it if various restrictions are placed on the questions that can be discussed.

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